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INTRODUCTION
As the sea level rises, the boundaries between privately owned coastal
property and sovereign submerged lands held in public trust are becoming
increasingly contested. 1 The common law doctrines that determine these
1. See generally Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102,
1106 (Fla. 2008) (involving a boundary dispute between private property owners and Walton County
arising out of efforts to re-nourish beaches critically eroded by a hurricane); Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 703 (2010) (affirming the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision); see also Deborah Wheeler, Beach Access Debate Continues to Be a Hot
Topic, WALTON SUN (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:00 PM) [hereinafter Beach Access],
http://www.waltonsun.com/article/20160323/NEWS/160329713 (chronicling citizens’ concerns over
their rights to use the beach); Deborah Wheeler, Attorney Retained in Walton Beach Access
Controversy, NW. FLA. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:09 AM) [hereinafter Attorney Retained],
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20160413/attorney-retained-in-walton-beach-access-
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boundaries under conditions of change—primarily accretion, erosion,
reliction, and avulsion—have important implications for all those involved
in adaptation planning along our coasts. 2 This includes private owners of
coastal property, local government officials seeking to develop and
implement adaptation strategies, beachgoers seeking to use shrinking
beaches, beach-tourism-dependent businesses, and courts facing cases
involving boundary disputes at the water’s moving edge. 3 This paper raises
the questions of whether and how the common law doctrines remain
relevant and applicable in an era of sea-level rise.
These doctrines create a legal framework that is problematic even
without sea-level rise. Commentators justly criticize these doctrines for
being vague, 4 lacking a coherent justification, 5 being inefficient, 6 and

controversy (stating that conflict over boundaries often arises in the context of disputes over public
rights to use the dry sand beach). Litigation over these rights is also becoming increasingly common.
See, e.g., Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing a
dispute between littoral landowner and county over public use after erosion reduced a dry-sand beach
area); Reynolds v. County of Volusia, 659 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a
dispute over county right to regulate beach); Lizette Alvarez, Florida Beachgoers Cling to a Right to
Make the Sand Their Driveway, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/us/
florida-beachgoers-cling-to-a-right-to-make-the-sand-their-driveway.html (chronicling legal battles in
Florida over public access to beaches).
2. See generally Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of
Riparian and Littoral Title Problem, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL L. 265, 275–82 (1991)
(explaining in depth the doctrines associated with the movement of water and their subsequent effects
on shoreline titles).
3. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 1091, 1106 (2011) (discussing rising litigation between private coastal owners and the
government); Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19,
38 (2009) (discussing financial dynamics of coastal property and beaches for the government).
4. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 351 (2010) [hereinafter Sax, Accretion]; David Rusk, Fix It or Forget It: How the
Doctrine of Avulsion Threatens the Efficacy of Rolling Easements, 51 HOUSTON L. REV. 297, 323–24
(2013); Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in Coastal Texas:
Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 391 (2011);
see also Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Tex. 2012) (Medina, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Court’s vague distinction between gradual and sudden or slight and dramatic changes to the coastline
jeopardizes the public’s right to free and open beaches . . . .”).
5. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351; Rusk, supra note 4, at 325–26; see also Joseph L.
Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. 641, 645 (2010) [hereinafter Sax, Rising Sea Levels] (explaining how the doctrine could be
interpreted as unreasonable).
6. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351; Christie, supra note 3, at 54 (alluding to the factors
that result in inefficient methods); see also McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 392 (explaining that property
owners’ efforts to rebuild will lead to inefficient public response to disaster and expensive litigation); 9
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 66.02[1] nn.1–2, 4 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2016) (discussing the challenge of proving the factual prerequisites).
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tending to create uncertainty. 7 They have pointed out that the primary
distinction the doctrines draw—between changes that are slow and
imperceptible and those that are rapid and observable—creates heavy
evidentiary demands with little benefit, and is ill matched to a reality where
many changes reflect a combination of rapid and slow processes. 8 Further,
commentators have suggested that the doctrines do not serve social values
well, particularly in an era of sea-level rise. 9 These critiques and the
reforms proposed by the commentators are valuable contributions; over
time, courts may take note of these concerns. However, real property law is
a field well known for its archaism and the slow pace at which courts
typically adopt change. 10 The courts’ conservatism about property law is
amplified by their concern about upsetting landowners’ expectations
without notice or fair process, which the specter of a judicial takings theory
heightens. 11
This paper approaches these doctrines from a different perspective: a
perspective focused specifically on their application in an era of sea-level
rise. It asks whether, on their own terms, these doctrines apply to cases
involving coastal property in an era of documented and ongoing sea-level
rise. Building on the insights of other legal scholars who have explored and
challenged traditional thinking about these doctrines, this paper asks
whether sea-level rise so changes material, doctrinally relevant facts that
cases arising along our coasts today are distinguishable from cases in prior
eras. 12 The doctrines of accretion, erosion, reliction, and avulsion developed
7. See Christie, supra note 3, at 54 (highlighting the reasons for uncertainty in the existing
legal framework); see also Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 735 (Medina, J., dissenting) (“But the exact metes
and bounds of the beachfront property line cannot be ascertained with any specificity at any given time
other than by reference to the mean high tide.”); Rusk, supra note 4, at 323.
8. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645; McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 382–83; Rusk,
supra note 4, at 326–27.
9. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645; Rusk, supra note 4 at 325 (suggesting that
application of the doctrine of avulsion jeopardizes public access to beaches); Sax, Accretion, supra note
4, at 356; Christie, supra note 3, at 48–52 (critiquing the Florida Supreme Court for misapplying the
ambulatory boundaries framework in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.).
10. A primary justification for this is the theory that a primary goal of property law is to
promote stability. See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L.
REV. 463, 466 (2007) (surveying theories of property as a tool to promote stability).
11. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S 702, 713–14
(2010) (plurality opinion supporting application of the Takings Clause to judicial decisions).
12. See Lovett, supra note 10, at 469, 470 (providing a detailed exploration of the relative
capacity of different property relationships to respond to radically changed circumstances). Lovett
defines radically changed circumstances to include events that are sudden, unexpected, intensely
disruptive, and geographically pervasive. Id. at 470–73. As Part II makes clear, the changes this paper
focuses on may not qualify as either sudden or unexpected. Using Hurricane Katrina as a case study,
Lovett proposes normative criteria for evaluating the resilience of property relationships, including
landlord-tenant and mortgagor-mortgagee. Id. at 495, 496, 515. The normative criteria he proposes for
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from and were applied in cases from prior eras. It argues that the factual
differences between the historic context and the conditions along our coasts
today demand that courts take account of these changes as they apply the
law governing coastal boundaries. 13
After laying out the contours of the relevant common law doctrines and
the rationales offered to support their application, the article identifies four
factual assumptions underlying the application of these doctrines. It goes on
to show that these assumptions are no longer true. These doctrines have
always dealt with dynamic water bodies, but sea-level rise changes the
dynamic coastal environment in four materially important ways. 14 This
article describes how the facts that characterize the context of sea-level rise
differ from those at all prior times in modern history. It then examines how
these factual differences affect whether and how each of the five principal
rationales underlying these common law doctrines remain applicable. It
concludes that the foundations for applying the ambulatory boundaries
framework have been so undermined in the context of sea-level rise that
courts should reconsider the application of this body of law to cases
involving coastal erosion. It then offers two approaches that courts might
use to adapt the law to the new realities.
evaluating resilience include whether, under conditions of radical change, the regimes: (1) encourage
parties to spread risk and to enlist outside resources; (2) offer economies of scale; (3) facilitate exit for
those needing or wishing to exit in ways that promote trust and cooperation; (4) facilitate entrance for
others; and (5) spread access to common resources more widely and equitably. Id. at 496. One could
analyze the rule governing the relationship between coastal landowners and the sovereign using these
criteria.
13. This project bears some relationship to the growing literature exploring whether and how
statutory law should adapt to deal with a changing climate. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 392–96 (2010)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation] (explaining how environmental sciences have evolved in
response to climate change and how environmental law must now do the same); J.B. Ruhl, Climate
Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1374, 1374 (2008) [hereinafter Ruhl, Structural Transformation] (arguing that resilience and adaptive
capacity are the keys to a legal system well adapted to intense and long-term demands brought about by
climate change); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends Without Breaking, 2
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 46–48 (2010) (suggesting that less rigid environmental laws
may lead to greater advances in climate change adaptation); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a
Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 273–74
(2012) (outlining policy responses to advance climate change adaptation solutions). The significant
difference is that this article focuses on common law doctrines rather than statutory law. As Professor
Ruhl points out in an article focused on making the legal system itself adaptive, the common law
possesses a unique evolutionary capacity. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and
Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1373, 1381 (2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, General Design Principles] (offering examples of changes in the
doctrine of nuisance in response to evolving understanding of the value of wetlands).
14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that climate change has rendered four assumptions of the
ambulatory boundaries framework untrue).
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Using Florida law as an illustration, Part I of this paper sets forth the
constitutional and common law that governs littoral property rights and
defines those lands protected by the public trust as sovereign submerged
lands. Florida is a state with a particularly high stake because of the length
of its coastline, 15 the significant effects it is already experiencing, 16 the
unique challenges it faces in responding to sea-level rise, 17 and its beachtourism-dependent economy. 18 Moreover, although each state’s law is
15. Florida has 8,436 miles of coastline, surpassed only by Alaska. See NOAA, OFF. FOR
COASTAL MGMT., GENERAL COASTLINE AND SHORELINE MILEAGE OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). Of these, 825 miles
DEP’T
ENVTL.
PROT.,
are
sand
beaches.
Why
Beach
Restoration,
FLA.
https://floridadep.gov/wra/beaches-funding/content/why-beach-restoration (last updated Sept. 7, 2017).
Seventy-five percent of Florida’s population lives in coastal counties, and these counties generate 79%
of the state’s economic activity. Nathalie Baptiste, That Sinking Feeling: The Politics of Sea Level Rise
and Miami’s Building Boom, THE AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 19, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/sinkingfeeling-politics-sea-level-rise-and-miamis-building-boom.
16. GARY T. MITCHUM, FLA. CLIMATE INST., SEA LEVEL CHANGES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN
UNITED STATES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 5, 9 (2011), http://floridaclimateinstitute.org/images/rep
orts/201108mitchum_sealevel.pdf. Reports in the popular press have highlighted in particular the
problem often called vertical or “sunny day” flooding associated with monthly high tides or spring tides.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami, NEW YORKER, Dec. 21 & 28, 2015, at 42, 45
(reporting that Florida suffers from three significant effects of global climate change: sea-level rise,
higher water tables, and extreme weather events).
17. The karst geology that produces vertical flooding limits the efficacy of seawalls, dikes, and
other structures designed to keep water out along much of the coast. The damaging storm surges
associated with the hurricanes to which Florida is vulnerable amplify the erosion caused by sea-level
rise. The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Compact has estimated that, in Southeast Florida alone, as
much as $4 billion worth of real estate value will be inundated at one foot of sea-level rise, and as much
as $31 billion of value will be inundated at three feet of sea-level rise. SE. FLA. CLIMATE COMPACT
CTYS., A REGION RESPONDS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 9–10 (2012),
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org//wp-content/uploads/2014/09/regional-climate-actionplan-final-ada-compliant.pdf. ClimateCentral estimates that 2.4 million people and 1.3 million homes
are within four feet elevation of the mean high water line in Florida. Ben Strauss, Florida and the Rising
Sea, SURGING SEAS, http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/news/floria-and-the-rising-sea (last visited Nov.
30, 2017).
18. Tourism spending in Florida in 2015 amounted to $89.1 billion, generating $5.3 billion in
tax revenue. An estimated 1.2 million Florida residents were employed by the tourism industry as of
early 2016. Will Seccombe, Florida Tourism Generated $89.1 Billion in Economic Impact in 2015,
SUNSHINE MATTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 11:40 AM) [hereinafter Florida Tourism],
http://www.visitfloridablog.org/?p=15486. An estimated 106,585,000 tourists visited Florida in 2015.
Id. A substantial portion of these visits Florida’s beaches. See FLA. TAX WATCH, INVESTING IN
TOURISM: ANALYZING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXPANDING FLORIDA TOURISM 4 (2013),
http://floridataxwatch.org/resources/p df/2013TourismFINAL.pdf. (“[A] 2011 Visit Florida Study found
that 40 percent of all U.S. visitors [to Florida] reported beach and waterfront activities as one of their top
activities when visiting Florida.”). Compared to the total 82.6 million tourism visitors in 2010, the seven
leading Florida theme parks (four Walt Disney World, two Universal, and Busch Gardens) had a total of
33 million visitors. Christopher Thompson, Florida Tourism Industry Welcomed 82.6 Million Visitors in
2010, SUNSHINE MATTERS (Feb. 16, 2011, 1:16 PM), www.visitfloridablog.org/?p=1573; Ray
Oldakowski, Florida’s Tourism Industry, AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS NEWSLETTER (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://news.aag.org/2013/11/floridas-tourism-industry/; see also CATANESE CTR., FLA. ATL. UNIV.,
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unique, the broad contours of Florida’s doctrine are similar to those of
many other coastal states. 19 Thus, the analysis can be readily adapted to
apply to other coastal states as well. 20 Drawing in part on the historical
work done by Professor Sax, Part I closes by identifying the five primary
rationales that justify application of the ambulatory boundaries framework:
(1) de minimis non curat lex; (2) fairness; (3) protection of the public
interest; (4) social utility/productivity of land; and (5) protection of littoral
landowners’ access to water. 21
Part II identifies four doctrinally significant factual predicates for
application of these doctrines that are absent in an era of sea-level rise. 22
Unlike the historic change experienced along coastlines, sea-level rise is
predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, geographically pervasive along the
coast, and generally restricted to coastal areas. 23 Both the changed physical
reality associated with sea-level rise and the impact these changed facts
have on the rationales for the common law framework undermine the legal
justification for applying these rules in areas affected by sea-level rise.
Based on this analysis, the article suggests that in cases arising in an
era of documented and scientifically predictable sea-level rise, common law
courts should take account of the changed facts. In Part III, the paper
presents two distinct approaches courts might take to adapt the law to the
new coastal realities.
The first, more limited approach that courts might adopt is to continue
applying the ambulatory boundaries framework while taking explicit
account of the realities associated with sea-level rise. Courts might also
consider how these realities affect the rationales underlying the ambulatory
boundaries framework. In this approach, courts would continue to apply the
doctrines, but better align their application with rationales that remain
relevant in the context of predictable, ongoing, and pervasive sea-level rise.
The second, more comprehensive approach is to clear the debris of the
ambulatory boundaries framework. This would leave two primary bodies of
directly relevant law: (1) the law governing real property boundary

ECONOMICS OF BEACH TOURISM IN FLORIDA (2005), https://www.dep.state.fl.us/beaches/publications/
pdf/phase2.pdf (describing the importance of the tourism industry in Florida).
19. See Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public
Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 109–19 (2011) (providing
a useful summary of state legal doctrines related to public trust and littoral rights and a chart
highlighting the areas of similarity and difference).
20. See id. (analogizing the summary to fit other coastal states).
21. See infra Part I.D (discussing rationales for ambulatory boundaries).
22. See infra Part II (discussing four factual assumptions: predictability; directionality;
frequency and scope; and homogeneity of water bodies).
23. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645.
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determinations and boundary and ownership changes; and (2) the law
governing submerged lands and protecting the public trust. 24 The
ambulatory boundaries framework has historically supplanted this law and
thus avoided the need to mediate the tension between them. 25 However, this
analysis suggests that courts can mediate this tension directly and
effectively by removing the distorting impact of the archaic ambulatory
boundaries framework.
Part III sketches how a court adopting either approach would analyze a
boundary question, and identifies some of the critiques and concerns that
each approach raises.
I. BEACH LAW: WHERE SOVEREIGNTY LANDS MEET LITTORAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
The law of public and private property rights at the coastline will
certainly become a more frequent and contentious battleground as the sea
level rises and state and local governments respond to the resulting and
anticipated changes. 26 The uncertainty that surrounds property boundaries
at the sea’s edge, even without sea-level rise, makes coastal property rights
a difficult and contentious terrain. 27 The relatively high value of coastal
property and the near certainty of coastal erosion make litigation over the
private owners’ rights and claims more likely. 28
Erosion already affects a substantial part of Florida’s coastline. 29
Almost half of the linear extent of Florida’s beaches have already been
designated “critically eroded” and, therefore, eligible for restoration and

24. See infra Part III (expanding on doctrinal implications of sea-level rise).
25. See generally Lear, supra note 2, at 265 (explaining the history of riparian boundaries and
how the framework has worked in place of land being put under public trust).
26. Doremus, supra note 3, at 1105–10.
27. Id. at 1105, 1109.
28. Id. at 1105–06. See, e.g., Deborah Wheeler, Walton Commission Votes in Favor of Public
Beach Access, NW. FLA. DAILY NEWS [hereinafter Wheeler, Walton Comm’n],
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20161026/walton-commission-votes-in-favor-of-public-beachaccess (last updated Oct. 26, 2016) (highlighting the contention between a customary use ordinance and
private property rights); CNN Wire Staff, Beachfront Homeowners Lose at Supreme Court, CNN (June
17, 2010, 5:22PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/06/17/scotus.property/index.html (detailing that
“[t]he homeowners [in arguing Stop the Beach Renourishment] told the court the difference between
beachfront and ‘beach view’—from an aesthetic and financial point of view—is tremendous when
property values are considered.”).
29. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Critically Eroded Beaches in Florida 4 (August 2016)
[hereinafter Critically Eroded], https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/CriticalErosionReport.pdf
(reporting 411.2 miles of Florida’s beaches as critically eroded and 93.5 miles as non-critically eroded).
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nourishment under the state beach management program. 30 In developed
areas, many private landowners are facing a one-way trend of erosion that
may entail the loss of property and ultimately jeopardize any structures on
the property. 31 Florida’s beaches face an uncertain future; both their
existence and the public’s right to enjoy those that survive are at risk.
Historically, there have been conflicts about property boundaries and
the application of statutes, the public trust doctrine, and other common law
principles to Florida’s beaches and beach-adjacent lands and waters. 32
However, perhaps because the conflicts were the exception rather than the
rule, most of those who have a stake in Florida’s beaches—coastal
landowners, beach-tourism-dependent businesses, state and local
government agencies, and even members of the public who use the
beaches—could afford to be somewhat lax in their understanding of the
scope of the various parties’ rights and duties. 33 Moreover, because of the
dynamic nature of the coastline and coastal property boundaries, property
owners and members of the beach-going public are frequently unaware of
the location of the littoral property boundary at any given time. 34 Even if
they fully understand the legal and factual basis for determining where the
boundary lies and the circumstances under which it might change, applying

30. As of 2016, 61% of Florida beaches (504.7 miles of 825 total miles) were eroding: 411.2
miles were critically eroded and 93.5 non-critically eroded. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 29.
Since 1998, the state has spent $626.6 million under its cost-sharing program for local and federally
authorized beach restoration and nourishment, pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 161.101 (2012). Under the
statute each level of local government typically contributes roughly a third of the cost. This funding has
gone to restore and maintain almost 56% of the state’s critically eroded beaches. Beach Management
Funding Assistance (BMFA) Program, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://floridadep.gov/wra/beachesfunding (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). However, as the recent experience with Hurricane Matthew
illustrated, these efforts can be quickly washed away by a single major storm, leading to increasing calls
to reevaluate the commitment to this strategy. See Robert S. Young, The Beach Boondoggle, Opinion,
TIMES
(Oct.
12,
2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/opinion/the-beachN.Y.
boondoggle.html?_r=0 (detailing the costs of beach renourishment and urging prioritization of federal
funding to create appropriate incentives that better align with the broader interest of all taxpayers).
31. Thomas K. Ruppert, Eroding Long-Term Prospects for Florida’s Beaches: Florida’s
Coastal Construction Control Line Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 65, 67–68 (2008).
32. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1109–14
(Fla. 2008) (explaining the relationship between public and upland owners under common law
principles and Florida’s statutes).
33. See, e.g., Beach Access, supra note 1 (describing the public’s lack of knowledge regarding
actions that restrict beach access).
34. See id. (highlighting the public’s confusion over the precise location of property
boundaries); see also Deborah Wheeler, Update: Walton Commissioners Vote to Remove Signs, Ropes
SUN
(Mar.
23,
2016)
[hereinafter
Walton
Update],
from
Beach,
WALTON
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20160615/update-walton-commissioners-vote-to-remove-signs-rop
es-from-beach (describing the public’s anger over the municipality regulating public spaces that were
believed to be private property).
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these rules is a complex, uncertain, and data-intensive inquiry in many
settings. 35
Even courts resolving disputes over public and private rights in the
contested coastal zone have sometimes been far from rigorous in their
analyses, resolving disputes with simplistic conclusions about causation, 36
and paying insufficient attention to legally important geographic features in
the area. 37 As the battle lines are drawn more frequently, far more technical
discussions about the mean high-water line, the foreshore between mean
low- and high-water lines, and the area between the mean high-water line
and the vegetation line have become essential. 38
A. Sovereign Submerged Lands and the Public Trust
Florida common law, like the law of many states, recognizes three
zones along the coast that have distinct characteristics under real property
law: submerged lands, foreshore, and dry sand beach. 39 An important, albeit
dynamic, boundary demarcation in this zone is the mean high-water line
(MHWL), a line determined based on the previous 19 years of mean high-

35. Given the arcane nature of the common law, such knowledge is not likely to be widely
held. See infra pp. 11–14 (discussing determination of littoral property boundaries under Florida
common law).
36. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106, aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 703 (2010) (affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s decision).
The Florida Supreme Court states that under Florida law, hurricanes are “generally considered avulsive
events.” Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1116. This seems an intuitively reasonable generalization.
However, the very cases the court cites for this proposition reflect the frequent factual complexity of the
impacts of hurricanes, not to mention the interaction of these impacts with subsequent erosion or
accretion in the same areas. See, e.g., Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(involving an argument that the property was cut through by a hurricane, but was subsequently covered
by an accretion to the plaintiff’s property).
37. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 79–80 (Fla. 1974)
(Boyd, J., dissenting) (referring generically to “beaches” as though the term were self-defining). The
division in the court in that case highlights the lack of clarity on how broad an area the courts should
consider in determining both whether customary rights attach and whether a given activity interferes
with them.
38. See generally Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 377 (stating that one of
first macro effects of climate change will be a transition in the vegetation line because of sea-level rise
and reduced rainfall); see also Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 58 (stating that, in Texas and New
Jersey, public trust governs all the way to the first line of vegetation); Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 47,
50, 54–56 (providing examples of how and why physical markers that determine private and state
property rights along the coast must be scrutinized carefully as effects of climate change become more
prolific).
39. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 60 (summarizing state legal doctrines related to
public trust and littoral rights).
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water lines. 40 The Florida constitution, state statutes, and common law
establish that the state holds lands below the MHWL in trust for the
public. 41 These lands include two zones with distinct qualities and legal
significance: sovereign submerged lands 42 and the foreshore (or wet sand
beach), which is the sandy area between the MHWL and the mean lowwater line. 43 The third zone, the dry sand beach, is less well defined, but
generally describes the area between the MHWL and the vegetation line.44
Florida Statute § 164.54 defines the term “beach” generally as extending
from the seaward boundary of the foreshore (i.e., the low water mark) to
“the place where there is marked change in material or physiographic form,
or to the line of permanent vegetation, usually the effective limit of storm
waves” (i.e., the vegetation line). 45
In describing the roots of the state’s title to the submerged lands under
navigable waters, the Florida Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that these
lands are held by the state:
[N]ot for purposes of disposition to individual ownerships, but
such title was held in trust for all the people of the states
respectively, for the uses afforded by the waters as allowed by
the express or implied provisions of law, subject to the rights
surrendered by the states under the federal Constitution. 46

Among the uses protected by the public trust in navigable waters, sovereign
submerged lands, and the foreshore are navigation, fishing, bathing, 47 and
activities for commerce. 48 The state has authority to regulate these uses and

40. FLA. STAT. §§ 177.27(14), (15) (2016) (defining “mean high water” and “mean high-water
line”).
41. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; FLA. STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974) (providing that the mean highwater line along coastlines is the boundary between state and privately owned land); Walton County,
998 So. 2d at 1109 (recognizing that the state holds land seaward of the MHWL in trust for the public);
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 707 (recognizing that in Florida, the state owns the
foreshore and submerged lands beneath navigable waters in trust for the public).
42. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
43. Id.; see White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939) (noting Florida law that recognizes
area between the high- and low-water marks as beach); see also Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 226
(Fla. 1919) (describing which lands and navigable waters are property of the state or of its people).
44. See Common Law & Statutes, FLA. SEAGRANT, https://www.flseagrant.org/wateraccess/co
mmon-law-statutes/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (illustrating the location of the dry sand beach relative
to the mean high tide).
45. FLA. STAT. § 161.54 (2011).
46. Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909).
47. White, 190 So. at 449.
48. See Brickell, 82 So. at 226 (listing navigation, fishing, and other useful purposes in addition
to commerce).
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a duty to do so under both the common law and the state constitution, 49
subject to Congress’s superseding authority to regulate commerce. 50
The MHWL thus defines the landward reach of shorelands and waters
subject to the public trust. Florida’s courts have repeatedly emphasized the
primacy of the government’s duty to use lands below the MHWL for proper
public uses, 51 consistent with the state’s duty under Article X, Section 11 of
the state constitution. 52
B. Private Lands and Littoral Rights
In general, the seaward boundary of property that extends to the ocean
and other tidal waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida,
is the MHWL. 53 Property that extends to the MHWL of a tidal water body
is typically called “littoral” property to distinguish it from property on
flowing water bodies such as rivers or navigable streams, which are
designated by the more general term riparian property. 54 Littoral and other

49. Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1110 (Fla. 2008)
(quoting FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a)) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air
and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the conservation and protection of
natural resources.”).
50. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109–10 (quoting Brickell, 82 So. at 221).
51. See, e.g., Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829, 830 (Fla. 1909) (describing scope of public
trust in a case involving a navigable lake); Brickell, 82 So. at 226 (explaining that states have the right to
uphold and maintain navigable waters).
52. This section provides:
The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state,
which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is
held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of
such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private
use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not
contrary to the public interest.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
53. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 48–49 (recognizing that under Florida law, the location of
the mean high-water line determines private and state property rights along the coast); see also FLA.
STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974) (stating that the mean high-water line is the seaward property boundary).
54. The term littoral property is also used to describe property bounding navigable lakes. In
general, the common law doctrines applied to littoral property are the same as those that apply to
riparian property that bounds a navigable stream, river or other flowing water. See, e.g., 4 HERBERT
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1219 (3d ed. 2016) (using littoral and riparian
rights interchangeably in describing the doctrine of accretion). Many of the basic principles related to
boundaries and riparian rights were adopted in cases involving a riparian context. Id. The term “riparian
rights” is typically used to describe the special rights accorded both littoral and riparian property
owners. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d
934, 936 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing that “[c]ases and statutes, however, have used ‘riparian owner’
broadly to describe all waterfront owners”).
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riparian landowners have special riparian rights in addition to sharing with
the public the right to fishing, bathing, navigation, and commerce. 55 In
Florida, these include the right of access to and from the water, the right to
retain an unobstructed view of the water, the right to use the water, and the
right to protect the abutting property from trespass. 56 In addition, littoral
landowners have what the Florida Supreme Court has recently
characterized as “contingent, future” rights under Florida common law: the
right to acquire title to land exposed or created as a result of the operation
of the common law doctrine of accretion. 57 The Florida Supreme Court
early on described the exclusive rights of a riparian owner as “such as are
necessary for the use and enjoyment of his abutting property and the
business lawfully conducted thereon; and these rights may not be so
exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights.” 58
C. The Dynamic Boundary and Its Legal Significance
Because the three zones noted above—submerged lands, the foreshore,
and the dry sand beach—are defined with reference to the ebb and flow of
the tides, their boundaries, and indeed their very location, can change as the
level of the tides change. 59 The MHWL is calculated over a period of 19

Although many of the same principles are applied similarly in the riparian and littoral
context, there are some points of divergence. See TIFFANY, supra §§ 1227–1229.1 (discussing separate
principles for lakebeds, islands, and seashores). Courts may consider the littoral context significant for a
variety of reasons. Moreover, the littoral context raises unique issues and challenges, including issues
related to beach restoration and nourishment, and specialized statutory provisions that govern coastal
areas. E.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105–07 (Fla.
2008) (involving a constitutional challenge aiming to stop Walton County from proceeding with a
beach-renoursishment project undertaken pursuant to a Florida statute). Because this paper focuses on
sea-level rise, it will primarily discuss littoral property and the law related to littoral lands without
noting the exceptions, where these rules may differ from those applicable in other riparian contexts.
55. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1111.
56. Id.; Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’
Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 644–45 (Fla. 1909). The right to an unobstructed view of the water is not as common
in other states as are the other riparian rights. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ET. AL., WATER LAW 37 (2017)
(stating that only a small number of states, which includes Florida, recognizes a riparian right to an
unobstructed view).
57. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1112 (noting that the right to acquire title to land
exposed or created by the doctrine of accretion is different from other riparian rights because it is a
contingent future right, not an easement).
58. Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. at 644–45.
59. See Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 186, 195, 197 (1974) (explaining that
coastal boundaries are defined by the average rise and fall of the tide, and that tidal characteristics vary
from place to place).
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years, 60 which reduces but does not eliminate the instability and uncertainty
associated with what is a fundamentally dynamic boundary. 61 Although the
mean averages out the changes in the tides, the boundary can still fluctuate
as much as the vagaries of the oceans and the common law legal framework
dictate. 62
Several different processes can occur to change the relative location of
the dry sand beach, the foreshore, and submerged lands, all of which have
potential impact on the extent of the lands subject to the public trust and
private ownership, respectively. 63 First, the sea can deposit sand or other
alluvium on areas that were previously part of the submerged lands or
foreshore, both held in public trust. 64 This may create dry land below the
old MHWL in areas that were previously submerged lands or foreshore. 65
Over time, such a change may cause the MHWL to move seaward. Second,
the sea can recede, leaving areas of the submerged lands or foreshore dry. 66
As with the deposit of alluvium, this can transform water into land and will
eventually cause the MHWL to move seaward. 67 Third, the sea can erode or
submerge land, transforming areas that were previously above the MHWL
(and therefore considered dry land) into foreshore or submerged lands. 68 It
can also transform the foreshore into submerged lands. This does not have
significant implications for ownership or public rights, since the state holds
both in trust for the public. 69 Each of these processes can occur naturally, or
as a direct or indirect result of human actions, such as filling, draining, or
building structures like groins, jetties, or sea walls. 70
60. FLA. STAT. § 177.27(14) (1998); Tidal Datums, NOAA TIDES & CURRENTS,
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html (last updated Oct. 15, 2013).
61. See Maloney, supra note 59, at 196 (explaining that determining boundaries like the
MHWL follows the moon’s 18.6 year nodal cycle, ultimately reducing the amount of variation).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 177.28(2) (1974) (stating that the legal significance of the MHWL as the
boundary between sovereign submerged lands and adjacent private lands “shall [not] be deemed to
modify the common law of this state with respect to the legal effects of accretion, reliction, erosion, or
avulsion”).
63. See Lear, supra note 2, at 266–70 (explaining five situations where dynamic shoreline
boundaries were litigated).
64. Id. at 276.
65. Id.
66. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 642.
67. Id.
68. As one court aptly noted, submersion and erosion are the reverse of the processes that
deposit alluvium, and if slow and imperceptible, they are subject to application of the same legal
principle. Mun. Liquidators v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
69. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 352 (explaining that when land is submerged, public
ownership moves landward to the new water’s edge); see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (providing that
submerged lands belong to the state).
70. Perhaps because up until the present, there has been only modest increase in sea level, case
law and commentary do not generally reference submersion of dry land without erosion. Any such
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In Florida, as in many jurisdictions, the law permits the seaward
boundary of littoral property to change in circumstances when the line
between water and dry land moves. 71 Florida, like many jurisdictions,
distinguishes between gradual and imperceptible changes to this boundary
on the one hand and sudden and dramatic changes on the other. 72 Gradual
changes are termed accretion, reliction (known also by the more archaic
term dereliction), or erosion, depending on which of the three processes
described above is involved. 73 Sudden changes in either direction are
generally described as resulting from avulsive events. 74 The term
“avulsion” is used generically to indicate a dramatic shift in the location of
water, whether the avulsive event causes a submersion of dry property, a
deposit of alluvium that transforms submerged land or the foreshore to dry
land, or a rapid withdrawal of water. 75 Under the applicable legal doctrine,
very different consequences result from gradual and imperceptible changes
following accretion, reliction, and erosion than from similar changes
following an avulsive event. 76
Florida is perhaps fortunate to have the clarity of a recent decision by
the state Supreme Court, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
included a review of the state’s basic property law as it relates to the
dynamic shoreline. 77 In Walton County v. Stop Beach the Renourishment,
change over time will likely cause erosion, as well. This paper will use the term erosion to encompass
submersion, as well. However, were the submersion of dry land to be solely the result of a dramatic and
sudden event, it might be best described as flooding or submersion. Such events would likely be covered
by the doctrine of avulsion rather than accretion/erosion.
71. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla.
2008) (stating that the legal effect of changes in the boundaries of shorelines depends on the speed of the
change); see also Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV.
1957, 1968–69 (2013) (stating that loss of land under the doctrine of avulsion does not change the preexisting mean high-water line).
72. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (Fla. 2008) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal
Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla.1987)) (explaining the
difference between gradual and sudden changes); TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1219; see also Peloso &
Caldwell, supra note 19, at 114 (noting specific rights of littoral owners in Florida).
73. Lear, supra note 2, at 265. In order to distinguish various scenarios, this article will use the
terms accretion, reliction, and erosion to describe relevant physical processes. The article will also
frequently use the term accretion to describe the legal doctrine that applies in cases of gradual erosion
and reliction. Therefore, although this paper will focus primarily on the doctrine of erosion, it will
sometimes refer to the doctrine of accretion/erosion, although doctrinal discussions often refer only to
accretion and avulsion, and ignore erosion. This paper will generally omit reference to reliction because
reliction is infrequently implicated in an era of sea-level rise.
74. Wyman & Williams, supra note 71, at 1970.
75. Id.
76. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311.
77. See generally Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1105 (rejecting challenges to the
constitutionality of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, a Florida statute under which restoration and
re-nourishment of almost half of the state’s beaches is ongoing).
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Inc., the Florida Supreme Court reviewed and reiterated the meaning of
these important common law doctrines. 78 It summarized the legal
consequences for the littoral property boundary of these different
processes. 79
Accordingly, under the doctrines of erosion, reliction, and
accretion, the boundary between public and private land is altered
to reflect gradual and imperceptible losses or additions to the
shoreline. In contrast, under the doctrine of avulsion, the
boundary between public and private land remains the MHWL as
it existed before the avulsive event led to sudden and perceptible
losses or additions to the shoreline. 80

The doctrines of accretion and erosion developed as an exception to the
common law property rule requiring a deed transferring title in order to
change a property boundary. 81 Under Florida law, changes are presumed to
be caused by gradual accretion, erosion, or submersion absent proof of an
avulsive event. 82 Thus, the accretion doctrine, pursuant to which the
boundary moves with the gradually shifting sands, represents the default
rule. 83 When rising seas or erosion change the MHWL, property boundaries
are subject to change as well, unless evidence is offered to sustain the
conclusion that the change was caused by an avulsive event. 84 Moreover,
78. Id. at 1109–14.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1114 (internal citation omitted).
81. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311–12 (explaining that in the 1600s, transfer of
accreted from sovereign to subject was exceptional and justified by the fact that the change was so
minimal as to be insignificant).
82. In Municipal Liquidators v. Tench, a district court of appeals in Florida stated that:
[T]here is a presumption of accretion or erosion as against avulsion. As stated in
Gubser v. Town, the law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that changes to riparian land occur “by accretion, and not by a sudden and violent
force.” Further, “[t]he person who claims the land under the water has the burden
of showing that it caved off suddenly.”
Mun. Liquidators, Inc., v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (The
Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co. (1904), reprinted in 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 331–332 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2006)). Professor Sax points out some notable
cases in which courts have strained to find accretion where it is hard to conclude that the change was
imperceptible as it occurred. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351–53. However, as the stakes increase
for landowners with sea-level rise, landowners’ challenges will likely put some pressure on courts that
have applied an almost irrefutable presumption of accretion in the past.
83. See, e.g., Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23, 34–36 (1904) (finding that the doctrine of
accretion governs absent proof of avulsion).
84. See Mun. Liquidators, 153 So. 2d at 731 (holding that the party claiming the benefit from
avulsion has the burden of proving avulsion occurred).
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even when a court finds that an avulsive event caused the change, the
doctrine only accords the landowner the “right to reclaim” the land “within
a reasonable time.” 85 Although rarely elaborated, this limitation seems best
explained by the fact that: (1) submerged lands are presumed to be of
limited value to landowners; and (2) submerged lands serve important
public interests under the public trust that will ultimately prevail unless the
landowner asserts the right to reclaim. 86
In the language quoted above, the Florida Supreme Court summarized
the legal doctrines by identifying the diagnostic fact that distinguishes the
setting in which the two doctrines apply: the speed of the change. 87
However, it is important to note that a change and the speed of the change
do not resolve the legal question. 88 A careful review of case law reveals that
proper application of these principles requires consideration of a number of
additional factors. As Joseph Sax notes in his excellent history of the
doctrines, the mere fact of a natural change did not automatically produce a
change in title. 89 The boundary changes only if a court, after considering
relevant factors or justifications, determines that the accretion doctrine
should apply. 90 In its opinion in Walton County, the Florida Supreme Court
explicitly adopted this approach as well. 91 Thus, the rationales or
justifications for applying the ambulatory boundaries framework play an
important role in the doctrines’ application. Likewise, the facts relevant to
these rationales have doctrinal significance. The next section examines
these rationales in detail below.

85. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117
(Fla. 2008) (stating that the doctrine of avulsion recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land
within a reasonable time”); see also Trs. of Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of Southampton v.
Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that the property owner had the right to
reclaim land that had become suddenly submerged, but not the portion lost through erosion).
86. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (conditioning the ability to reclaim on reasonable
time and citing earlier case allowing self-help in doing so); Mun. Liquidators, 153 So. 2d at 731
(holding that the party claiming the benefit from avulsion has the burden of proving avulsion occurred).
87. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117.
88. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 324 (requiring that claimants to accreted land show
legal justification for a change in title).
89. Id. at 324–25.
90. Id.
91. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118–19 (finding that none of the four rationales for
according a right to accretion applied in the context of the case).
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D. The Rationales Supporting the Doctrines of Accretion/Erosion and
Avulsion
Joseph Sax’s analysis of the historical roots of the common law
doctrines illustrates the change over time in values used to justify the
contours of these common law doctrines. 92 Sax’s analysis also shows the
doctrines’ lack of coherence with the rationales that historically justified
their use. 93 Notwithstanding these apt critiques, certain justifications for
applying the doctrines have endured throughout most of their history. These
rationales are: (1) the minimal impact of boundary changes to property
interests (the de minimis rationale); (2) reciprocity or fairness;
(3) protection of the sovereign’s (or public) interest; and (4) social utility or
productive use of land. 94 These four rationales appear fairly consistently in
the earliest British cases. However, a fifth rationale or justification has
become central and arguably dominant in American common law:
protection of the littoral landowner’s right of access to the water. 95
In its decision in Walton County, the Florida Supreme Court
considered all five key rationales to justify its decision. 96 In deciding that
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act did not deprive littoral owners of the
riparian right to receive future accretions, the Court concluded that none of
the rationales for allowing accretions to benefit a littoral property owner
supported applying the doctrine to the plaintiff’s context. 97 The Court
surveyed four core rationales for allowing the accretion doctrine to change
property boundaries: de minimis non curat lex; reciprocity; productive use
of land; and preservation of the riparian right of access to water. 98 It also
noted that the right to accretion arises from “a rule of convenience intended

92. See generally, Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 334–42 (exploring the evolution over time
of the rationales offered, including rationales that have been abandoned, such as the “lost boundary”
rationale, and newer rationales, such as maintaining water access). The analysis here distills the
common components of the rationales that endure to the present.
93. Id. at 337 (describing how, in the 19th century, English jurisprudence retained the
accretion/avulsion doctrine when all the rationales that had supported the doctrines had been abandoned
or rejected).
94. Id. at 330.
95. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as
primary rationale in modern United States cases); POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (citing
numerous cases and describing water access as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for
accretion).
96. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118–19.
97. Id. at 1114–15, 1118 (discussing de minimis, reciprocity, and productive use of land and
water access, and describing the legal framework as balancing public and private interests).
98. Id. at 1114 (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach
Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 212–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
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to balance public and private interests . . . .” 99 It identified the rationale for
applying the avulsion doctrine as the need to mitigate the hardship of
drastic shifts in title resulting from sudden and unexpected changes in the
shoreline. 100 On the facts before it, the Court concluded that “[n]one of [the]
doctrinal reasons [for applying the rule of accretion] apply here.” 101
The relationship between these rationales and the slow/fast distinction
that determines which rule applies is subtle and not always obvious. Some
of the rationales seem equally applicable whether the change is slow or fast.
In other words, they do not always justify the preference for applying one
rule over the other. Most of the time, they justify having a distinct rule in
the coastal boundaries context instead of applying background common law
property rules that generally govern boundaries. Some of the rationales
support both rules for different reasons. This part briefly describes each of
the five rationales, both as each appears in the early British cases and in
recent United States case law. Part II then explores the connection between
these rationales and the changed factual reality presented in the context of
sea-level rise.
1. De Minimis Non Curat Lex
Sax’s history illustrates that the earliest cases applying the ambulatory
boundaries framework relied on the fact that the volume of acreage
involved was too small to concern the sovereign as a rationale for applying
the special legal framework. 102 This rationale justified depriving the
sovereign of lands in cases of accretion. 103 Given that the acreage involved
in some of the early cases offering this rationale is arguably substantial, 104
Sax suggests that perhaps the de minimis concept is contextual and best
understood as referring not to the acreage assessed in the abstract, but to the
impact on the sovereign’s overall interest in controlling the coast and
submerged lands. 105 In that light, even hundreds of acres might be
considered to be of little significance to the king’s interest, which largely
lay in preserving public access to navigation and protecting strategic
military interests in the coast during that era. 106 Another possible reading is
that the sum of the lands likely to be affected by applying the doctrines was
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1118.
Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312, 324 (referring to de minimis non curat lex).
Id.
See id. at 331 (discussing a case that involved property measuring 453 acres).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 325.
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de minimis because cases of significant accretion and erosion were rare. 107
Modern cases continue to offer de minimis impacts as a rationale justifying
application of the ambulatory boundaries framework. 108
2. Fairness
From the earliest British cases through to the modern era, fairness has
appeared as a core value to which courts have looked to justify accretion
and avulsion. 109 In cases of accretion, courts justify awarding newly
exposed or created land to riparian landowners on a theory of “reciprocity”
that is grounded in fairness. 110 Riparian landowners deserve to benefit from
the gains of a receding sea, as the argument goes, because they bear the
special costs and risks of inundation, as well. 111 Fairness also appears, albeit
in a slightly different form, as a justification for the avulsion doctrine. 112
The relative hardship produced by a dramatic shift in title resulting from a
sudden event is a theme in both older and modern cases. 113 Allowing the
boundary to remain unchanged permits the landowner to reclaim the land if
reclamation is feasible and can be accomplished within a reasonable

107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118
(“[C]ritically eroded shorelines can hardly be characterized as trifles with which the law does not
concern itself.”); TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1219 n.4 (citing State Eng’r of Nev. v. Cowles Bros., Inc.,
478 P.2d 159, 162 (Nev. 1970)) (involving reliction). But see POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01 n.24
(stating that justification has received little modern support.).
109. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 325, 342.
110. Id. at 308, 320.
111. Id. at 320, 321–22 (discussing the Abbot of Ramsey’s case and Callis on Sewers,
respectively). In the Abbot of Ramsey’s case, the reciprocity is expressed in terms of the landowner’s
marsh, which “sometimes shrinks, through the influx of the sea, and at other times is enlarged by the
flowing out of the sea . . . .” Id.at 318. See also id. at 340 n. 199, 341 (discussing the 19th Century
American treatise writer Roger Angell’s incorporation of the reciprocity rationale to support the doctrine
of accretion, and identifying Hall’s adoption of Blackstone’s three rationales for accretion, one of which
was reciprocity). More modern cases include Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 329 (1973)
(describing a “compensation theory” that justifies awarding riparian landowner accretions); Banks v.
Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 67 (1864) (providing two different reasons coastal property owners should benefit
from a receding sea); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 57 (1874) (holding that a riparian
owner has a fair right to avulsion); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2009) (summarizing compensation or equity theory).
112. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 336.
113. See id. at 324–25 (suggesting that the gradualness of the process of change may diminish
the sense of loss); Bonelli Cattle, 414 U.S. at 327 (stating that the rationale for avulsion is to mitigate the
hardship that a shift in title resulting from a sudden shift in a river would cause); Walton County, 998
So. 2d at 1113–14; see also POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n. 42 (citing Cox v. F-S Prestress, Inc.,
797 So. 2d 839, 843–44 (Miss. 2001)).
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time. 114 Given fairness’s use as a justification for both a static and a moving
boundary, this rationale does not provide a coherent justification for
treating sudden events differently from slow and imperceptible ones.
However, it can perhaps be understood as justifying the deviation from the
traditional principles governing real property boundary law.
3. Protection of the Sovereign/Public Interest
Britain implicitly recognized protection of the sovereign’s interest as
an important consideration fairly early, although in some cases it was
honored in the breach. 115 Sax notes that by the 1600’s, commentators in
England recognized the importance of the sovereign’s interest in land at the
water’s edge. 116 In several cases recounted by Callis, courts refused to
allow the landowner to claim title to new land in cases of extensive reliction
because of the impact on the sovereign. 117 Lord Hale, and later British
commentators and decisions, regarded the avulsion doctrine as aligned with
the sovereign’s strategic interests in the shoreline because the avulsion
doctrine left the boundary in place when sudden and substantial changes
occured. 118 Callis and Blackstone acknowledged this interest even when
finding it unaffected in some cases where the de minimis nature of the
sovereign’s loss justified applying the accretion doctrine. 119 A few later
cases emphasize the sovereign or public interest, 120 but modern U.S. courts
114. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (stating that the doctrine of avulsion
recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land within a reasonable time”); see also Trs. of
Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of Southampton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975) (holding that the property owner had the right to reclaim the land that had become suddenly
submerged, but not the portion lost through erosion).
115. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312, 324.
116. Id. at 312 n.29.
117. Id. at 322 (describing the cases of Brown and Bushey). This was recast by Hall in his 1853
essay to emphasize the de minimis amount of land. In Hall’s view, imperceptibility of the change
provided a proxy for evidence of lack of value and hence a conclusion of negligible impact on the
sovereign. Id.
118. Id. at 325, 327. This leaves unaddressed the risk of slow but substantial change, which
could adversely affect the sovereign’s interest, but presumably not in such a dramatic fashion, hence
providing the sovereign time to adapt or respond to the changing situation. See id. at 332 n.149
(discussing the House’s of Lords explicit consideration of the lack of harm to the sovereign’s interest in
Lord Yarborough’s case, awarding 453 acres formed by accretion to the littoral landowner, and
distinguishing cases in which large areas of sovereign lands are exposed suddenly); id. at 342
(discussing three rationales for the rule of accretion in Hall’s Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the
Privileges of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm).
119. Id. at 312, 324.
120. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 328 (1973) (finding the rationale for avulsion
not applicable because the river was too wide and shallow to permit navigation, thereby limiting the
state’s interest in the property). In Corpus Christi v. Davis, a Texas appellate court declined to
determine the question of the applicability of the doctrine of avulsion to tidelands because of its
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often focus on the public trust doctrine and the sovereign’s duties as trustee
of submerged lands as the legal grounding for considering the protection of
the public interest in these cases. 121
4. Social Utility
The theme of social utility similarly appears in several different guises
throughout these doctrines’ evolution. At its heart, this rationale focuses on
productive use of land. 122 It is often expressed in the notion that land ought
to have an owner. 123 This is a somewhat puzzling assertion, because the
question in all these cases is not whether the land will be unowned, but
rather who will be the owner. 124 Nonetheless, the underlying value asserted
seems to be the social good of productive use of land by private
landowners. This rationale appears in both early 125 and recent 126 cases.
A related notion that early commentators identified, but which fell out
of favor, was that customary use, or something akin to prescription,
justified the accretion doctrine. 127 This Lockean notion of rewarding land
potential impact on the public interest. See Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App.
1981) (“Application of the rule of avulsion to tidal lands would permit private ownership of land under
the sea, would restrict the enjoyment of public beaches, would jeopardize the right of the public to
navigate upon and to fish in the State’s waters, and would render the location of seaward boundaries an
exercise of pure guesswork.”); see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.
2d 1102, 1113–14 (Fla. 2008) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 261–62 (1743)) (describing common law doctrines as reflecting an attempt to balance public
and private interests).
121. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109, 1114–15 (discussing the balancing between
public and private interests).
122. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] nn.30 & 32. Powell also notes the flip side—the
inefficiency of small isolated tracts of land surrounded by water. Id.; see also Aronow v. State, No. A120585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (discussing the state’s duty to put public
land to productive use). See generally Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., 196 S.W.3d 5, 7, 11 (Ark. 2004)
(examining the transfer of mineral rights and royalties of an unsevered mineral interest due to riverbank
accretion).
123. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118 (finding it is within the community’s interest
to ensure all land is owned).
124. See id. at 1105 (posing the issue of whether residents’ land was taken, which required a
determination of original ownership).
125. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 333 & n.150 (discussing Lord Yarborough’s case in
which the House of Lords noted “occupation and improvement” as grounds for accretion, and stated that
slowly accreted lands adjacent to a littoral landowner are of almost immediate use and value to the
landowner, but “of no use to the King”). See generally Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 69 (1864)
(expanding on the concept that land should not be left unowned).
126. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (expanding on the public policy consideration
that all lands should have an owner); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2009) (expanding on the public policy consideration that all lands should have an owner).
127. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 319 (summarizing Hale’s description of the Abbot of
Peterborough’s case).
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users has both fairness and utilitarian strains. 128 This theme of rewarding
use also appears in a form akin to archaic, almost mystical notions of
property—that the land “becomes part and parcel of the upland estate” by
virtue of the adjacent landowner’s use. 129
5. Protection of Littoral Landowners’ Right of Access to Water
As Professor Sax points out, protection of the riparian right of access to
water was not among the values explicitly considered in the early
development of accretion and avulsion doctrines in Britain. 130 However, it
has become of primary importance in the United States, 131 becoming
arguably the single strongest rationale for both doctrines. 132
II. ERODING FOUNDATIONS: HOW SEA-LEVEL RISE UNDERMINES THE
AMBULATORY BOUNDARIES FRAMEWORK
The dynamic environment along our coasts today fundamentally differs
from the environment assumed to exist at the water’s edge when these
doctrines were developing. Part II.A catalogs the ways in which sea-level
rise creates a context that is distinct, in arguably relevant ways, from the
context in which the ambulatory boundaries framework developed and has
been applied until recently. It describes four key factual assumptions made
in the cases from which the doctrine developed and in which they have
recently been applied. These assumptions recognize that the environment is
dynamic to some extent, but assume that the system operates within defined
boundaries based on experience. 133 It then describes how sea-level rise
changes the factual context, such that these four assumptions are no longer
true.
128. Id. at 333–34.
129. Id. at 330 (examining the rationale for the rule’s method of disposing of land).
130. Id. at 347.
131. Id. at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as the primary rationale in modern
U.S. cases); see Bonelli Cattle v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (recognizing that the riparian
quality of the land may be the land’s most valuable feature). See generally TIFFANY, supra note 54,
§ 1219 (stating that the rules are designed to protect a littoral or riparian owner’s right of access to the
water).
132. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (citing numerous cases and describing water access
as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for accretion); see also State of Oregon v. Sause,
342 P.2d 803, 825 (Or. 1959) (quoting Hanson v. Thornton, 179 P. 494, 496 (Or. 1919) (“When we
speak of riparian rights, we are not considering a mere shadowy privilege, but a substantial property
right, the right of access to and a usufruct in the water.”).
133. Professor Ruhl describes similar assumptions made by ecologists under the dynamic
equilibrium model as exhibiting the flawed assumption of stationarity—fluctuation within an
unchanging envelope of variability. Ruhl, Structural Transformation, supra note 13, at 1393–94.
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First, unlike the changes in littoral boundaries experienced historically,
which were random and unpredictable, sea-level rise is predictable. 134
Second, courts premised the ambulatory boundaries framework on the
assumption that the change experienced by littoral landowners is equally
likely to be a gain or a loss; in contrast, sea-level rise is “unidirectional,” 135
as Joseph Sax aptly termed the change. 136 Third, the changes experienced
historically were episodic and geographically limited. Sea-level rise is
ongoing and predicted to continue for hundreds of years, and it will have
geographically pervasive effects and a broad social impact. 137 Fourth,
courts developed these doctrines to address all water bodies and assumed
homogeneity of the processes of change affecting all water bodies. 138 Sealevel rise only affects properties that are near to the coast. 139 Part II.B
elaborates on each of these archaic factual assumptions and the changes
resulting from sea-level rise.
Part II.B then considers how these factual changes undermine the
rationales that supported both the development and the current application
of the ambulatory boundaries framework. It considers each of the five
rationales for the ambulatory boundaries framework, evaluating how the
changed facts affect the viability of these rationales. This raises the question
of whether these doctrines, on their own terms, have continued application
in the context of sea-level rise and, if so, how these changed facts should
affect their application. 140

134. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing common law’s failure to differentiate between different
bodies of water).
139. Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr. et al., Hotspot of Accelerated Sea-Level Rise on the Atlantic Coast
of North America, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 884, 884 (2012).
140. This analysis seems congruent with Professor Flatt’s recommendation in the statutory
realm, that in deciding how to apply or adapt a legal regime, one should identify “stress points in a
changed future, and how legal and policy alterations can address those stress points while preserving the
original purposes of the regime and considering both distributive justice and efficiency.” Flatt, supra
note 13, at 287. In this setting, the archaic factual assumptions are the stress points, and the rationales
underlying ambulatory boundaries framework are analogous to a statutory regime’s “original purposes.”
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A. Four Archaic Factual Assumptions
1. Predictability
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Unpredictable
The notion that the change in water bodies’ profiles is random and
unpredictable is almost part of the DNA of the ambulatory boundaries
framework. Cases applying the ambulatory boundaries framework evince a
fatalistic acceptance of the unpredictable vagaries of water bodies.141
References to the changes in the coastline that precipitated litigation in
early cases suggest that the occurrence, direction, extent, and timing of
these changes were random and unpredictable events.142 This factual
predicate supports the fairness rationale for the accretion and the avulsion
doctrines. 143
b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is Neither Random nor Totally Unpredictable
Sea-level rise is a documented and ongoing process.144 It is not
random, and it is becoming increasingly predictable.145 It is the subject of
extensive scientific study. Technology has enabled scientists to estimate
confidently the direction and likelihood of change over the coming decades,
141. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (“Riparian land is at the
mercy of the wanderings of the river.”); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012)
(“Oceanfront beaches change every day. Over time and sometimes rather suddenly, they shrink or grow,
and the tide and vegetation lines may also shift. Beachfront property lines retract or extend as previously
dry lands become submerged or submerged lands become dry.”).
142. Cases involving avulsive events describe them as sudden and unusual. Severance, 370
S.W.3d at 708 passim (describing the sudden and dramatic changes in beachfront areas); Wood v.
McAlpine, 118 P. 1060, 1064 (Kan. 1911) (holding that for an event to constitute avulsion, “the
change . . . must be . . . sudden, and unusual . . . .”). In cases involving accretion, courts emphasize the
vagaries of changes that could make littoral owners either winners or losers. See supra Part I.D.2
(discussing the fairness rationale behind the ambulatory boundaries framework). While accretion cases
often emphasize the bidirectionality of change in particular, these statements also suggest a general lack
of predictability. The gain that a large accretion represents is often justified by the risk of an equally
large erosion. See, e.g., United States v. 11993.32 Acres of Land, 116 F. Supp. 671, 678 (D.N.D. 1953)
(“A rule of law cannot control the vagaries of a river. Hence, the general rule rests upon the equitable
idea that a riparian owner should have the opportunity to gain by accretion since he is subject to the
hazard of loss by erosion.”).
143. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the fairness rationale behind the ambulatory boundaries
framework).
144. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2–4 (Paulina Aldunce et al. eds., 2015),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf (noting observed
changes in the climate system).
145. See id. at 10–16 (discussing past and present climate change observations and what future
projections might be based on those observations).
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despite uncertainty about the pace of that anticipated change. 146 Although
the precise timing and extent of changes anticipated along the coast is
uncertain, the fact that scientists can confidently predict the direction and
likelihood of change has important ramifications for the rationales that
justify the erosion and avulsion doctrines. 147 Today, hurricanes, storms, and
the attendant damaging storm surges are reasonably foreseeable for any
coastal landowner with a structure close to the shoreline. 148 The courts that
developed and applied these doctrines clearly did not envision a generally
predictable process that would continue for at least several hundred years,
thereby giving landowners and the sovereign notice and opportunity to plan
ahead.
2. Directionality
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Equally Likely to Move
the Boundary in Either Direction
The common law doctrines also envision that landowners may be
winners or losers due to the vagaries of the tides on any given day. 149 The
land they were using might become submerged and no longer usable, or the
sea might expose new usable land. Historically, litigants and courts seemed
146. E.g., DAVID ANTHOFF ET AL., Global and Regional Exposure to Large Rises in Sea-Level:
A Sensitivity Analysis §§ 1, 2.1 (Tyndall Ctr. for Climate Change Research, Working Paper No. 96,
2006) (noting that “even if the climate is stabili[z]ed, sea levels continue to rise for many centuries due
to the long timescales of the oceans and the large ice sheets”); Anny Cazenave & William Llovel,
Contemporary Sea Level Rise, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF MARINE SCIENCE 145 (2010) (stating that tide
gauge measurements showing significant sea-level rise have been available since the 20th century); John
A. Church & Neil J. White, Sea-Level Rise from the Late 19th to the Early 21st Century, 32 SURV.
GEOPHYSICS 585, 585–86 (2011) (stating that sea levels will continue to rise even if emissions are
curbed and the atmosphere stabilized); IPCC, supra note 144, at 10–16 (discussing past and present
climate change observations and what future projections might be based on those observations); SEA
LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT., UNIFIED SEA LEVEL RISE
PROJECTION FOR SOUTHEAST FLORIDA 1, 4, 7–8 (2015), http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.or
g/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-Compact-Unified-Sea-Level-Rise-Projection.pdf (projecting the
anticipated range of sea-level rise for the Southeast Florida region from 1992–2100).
147. This is explored in detail infra Part II.B.
148. The national media frequently cover not only extreme events such as Superstorm Sandy,
but also the damaging effects of storm surge and tides exacerbated by sea-level rise. E.g., Lizette
Alvarez & Frances Robles, Intensified by Climate Change, “King Tides” Change Ways of Life in
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/intensified-by-climatechange-king-tides-change-ways-of-life-in-florida.html?emc=eta1&_r=0 (examining the phenomena of
“sunny day” flooding due to rising sea levels); Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change Could Swamp
Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/science/globalwarming-coastal-real-estate.html?emc=eta1 (reporting that homebuyers are becoming increasingly wary
of purchasing homes along the coast).
149. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 320.
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to assume that changes in the coast creating new land and submerging dry
land were equally likely. 150 This factual assumption of bidirectional change
provides key support for the reciprocity rationale that, in turn, supports the
accretion doctrine. 151 The fact that one of the two directions in which
change could occur exposed new dry land was also critical to both the
social-utility rationale for accretion, 152 and the rationale of protecting
littoral landowners’ access to water. 153
b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise is Unidirectional
The factual assumption that coastal landowners have roughly equal
chances of loss and gain is no longer justified in an era of sea-level rise.
The scientific predictions regarding change along America’s coast clarify
that changes are no longer anticipated to occur with equal likelihood in both
directions. 154 Today, the dynamic along our coasts is (and will continue to
be) predominantly erosion and inundation. 155
150. See id. at 318 (quoting description from Abbot of Ramsey’s case that “the marsh
sometimes shrinks, through the influx of the sea, and at other times is enlarged by the flowing out of the
sea . . . .”). Some cases involve a single geographic area that has recently experienced change in both
directions. See, e.g., Siesta Properties v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 219, 222–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(involving accretions that formed on a location where a barrier island had previously eroded).
151. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (describing a “compensation
theory” that justifies awarding riparian landowner accretions); Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 67 (1864)
(providing two different reasons coastal property owners should benefit from a receding sea); County of
St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 57 (1874) (reasoning that riparian property owners’ gains through
avulsion are a reciprocal consideration for their more frequent losses); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28
v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (summarizing compensation or equity theory).
152. See Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1,
2012) (discussing the state’s duty to put public land to productive use); Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co.,
196 S.W.3d 5, 7, 11 (Ark. 2004) (examining the transfer of mineral rights and royalties of an unsevered
mineral interest due to riverbank accretion); Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998
So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 2008) (finding it is within the community’s interest to ensure all land is owned);
Banks, 69 U.S. at 69 (expanding on the concept that land should not be left unowned); Maunalua Bay
Beach Ohana 28, 222 P.3d at 445 (expanding on the public policy consideration that all lands should
have an owner).
153. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as
the primary rationale in modern United States cases); POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (describing
water access as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for accretion).
154. E.g., Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-Level Rise and Its Impacts on Coastal
Zones, 328 SCIENCE 1517, 1518 (2010) (finding that the immediate effect of SLR is submergence and
increased flooding on coastland); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 10–11
(acknowledging the fact that an increase in loss of natural ecosystem services will cause coastal
properties to lose more land to avulsion and erosion than have gains by accretion).
155. Of course, even in an era of sea-level rise, some coastal areas will experience accretion or
reliction. However, the vast majority of littoral areas are facing inexorable and ongoing erosion or
submersion. In addition, current erosion and attendant flooding on some areas of the coastline are more
heavily influenced by inlet-management practices than by sea-level rise at present. Ruppert, supra note
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This changed reality has profound implications for our law and policy.
It fundamentally alters the nature of the social problem posed by the
dynamic coastline. Framing coastal change as sometimes presenting
opportunities for social gains—in other words, presenting the possibility of
winning or losing property in the coastal dynamic and the battle for title—is
directly linked to the assumption of bidirectionality.
Because we are primarily a land-based species, there can only be
meaningful social gains when the ocean recedes or land accretes, yielding
more land for human endeavors. 156 In contrast, submergence of land has
almost always been experienced as a loss. 157 Indeed, even a legal victory for
a landowner whose land has been submerged awards that landowner
nothing more than the right to reclaim the land from the ocean. 158 In such
cases, the changes to the coastline have not produced a social gain. On the
contrary, the landowner has merely won the right to try to avoid a loss by
undoing the social harm from the inundation.
The change from a win-lose dynamic to a lose-lose dynamic is
significant. Instead of needing a legal framework that can both allocate
gains and losses, we may need a framework designed to deal with a
situation that will largely entail allocating losses, not gains.

31, at 65, 67, 68. Over time, however, sea-level rise represents a far greater threat and will overtake the
effects of other human activities. See THE FLA. OCEANS & COASTAL COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
SEA-LEVEL RISE IN FLORIDA 11 (2010) https://www.flseagrant.org/wp-content/uploads/Climate_Chang
e_and_Sea_Level_Rise.pdf. Moreover, increasing awareness of sea-level rise’s impacts has motivated
governments to improve inlet-management practices. In Florida, there is legislation requiring the
Department of Environmental Protection to develop a statewide Beach Management Plan that includes
inlet-management plans. FLA. STAT. § 161.161 (2010). Section 161.041(1)(b) requires that mitigation
measures accompany authorization of inlet-management activities. Id. § 161.041(1)(b); see also Thomas
P. Pierro, A Renewed Focus on Inlet Management: Committing to the Contributions of Dr. Dean and
Senator Jones (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.fsbpa.com/15AnnualConfPresentations/Pierro.pdf
(demonstrating the need for further developments in inlet management in Florida).
156. Allocating title to additional submerged land to the sovereign may protect the sovereign’s
interest in owning the submerged lands all the way to the water’s edge, but the incremental increase in
the actual stock of submerged lands rarely has any tangible benefits for the sovereign or the public.
Exceptional situations could include areas with oyster beds or valuable harborage. However, in most
situations, the submergence of lands does not improve the sovereign’s or public’s position in a
meaningful way. In most cases, a legal ruling awarding title to the sovereign merely prevents a loss—
loss of control over the crucial area at the water’s edge.
157. Robert A. Morton, U.S. Geological Survey Ctr. for Coastal and Watershed Studies,
Introduction: An Overview of Coastal Land Loss with Emphasis on the Southeastern United States,
(2003), https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2003/of03-337/intro.html.
158. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1116, 1117 (Fla.
2008) (explaining that landowners gain only the right to reclaim land lost to inundation up to the
MHWL).
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3. Frequency and Scope of Change
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Episodic, Occasional,
and of Limited Geographic Scope
The common law doctrines developed to resolve the exceptional cases
along an otherwise stable coastline. 159 In most areas, courts only use the
doctrines to address occasional, episodic changes caused by events such as
hurricanes, 160 by human activity, 161 or in areas that are particularly
susceptible to change. 162 Historically, these cases were not only episodic;
they were limited in geographic scope. 163 Early courts and commentators
frequently justified their decisions through the de minimis impact of
applying these doctrines. 164 As Sax explains, courts considered the impact
of cases on the King’s interest as de minimis even when the acreage
involved was clearly significant. 165 However, this characterization makes
sense because the cumulative impact on the king’s interest was limited.
This was true because the changes experienced along the coastlines were
limited in geographic scope, and thus unlikely to affect the public
interest. 166

159. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312 (explaining that when the rule of accretion was
applied to coastlines, transfer of title from sovereign to subject was considered exceptional).
160. See, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1970) (involving a controversy over a
narrow strip of land that was a narrow strip of water before a hurricane struck); Siesta Properties v. Hart,
122 So. 2d 218, 220, 223–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (examining the effects of accretion on Florida
coastal property rights following a hurricane).
161. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d
934, 935 (Fla. 1987) (noting that a city-built jetty caused accretion). Inlet management and related
human activities are a significant contributor to coastal erosion in many coastal areas, exacerbating the
effects of sea-level rise, and in some areas dwarfing them. Ruppert, supra note 31, at 67–68.
162. See Robert E. Beck, The Wandering Missouri River: A Study in Accretion Law, 43 N.D. L.
REV. 429, 436–37 (1967) (documenting several cases involving the Missouri River and its impact on
riparian property rights); see also Siesta Properties, 122 So. 2d at 219, 220 (involving accretions that
formed on a location where a barrier island had previously eroded).
163. Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 837; Siesta Properties, 122 So. 2d at 218, 219, 220.
164. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc.,
272 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (identifying de minimis non curat lex as one of the
reasons for the accretion doctrine); Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1113 (Fla. 2008) (listing de minimis impact as one of the four reasons for the accretion doctrine).
165. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313.
166. Id. at 329.
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b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is Ongoing and Geographically Pervasive
Sea-level rise is an ongoing—not an episodic—phenomenon. 167
Although periodic storms may accelerate the pace and extent of change in a
given geographic area,168 there is adequate scientific evidence to conclude
that sea-level rise is an ongoing and inexorable process.169 Changes in the
coastline are also no longer the exception; they are now the norm, even if
scientists cannot precisely predict the pace of the change. 170 At the very
least, courts should consider whether rules designed to handle an
occasional, exceptional occurrence should apply when the exception
becomes the rule.
Unlike the changes experienced in the past, sea-level rise is also
geographically pervasive along our coasts.171 The anticipated changes along
the nation’s coasts threaten to impair the public’s access to water and
beaches. They also threaten ecosystem values throughout entire regions and
states. 172 Although sea-level rise will affect some areas less (because of
topography or other factors), it is causing and will cause change along

167. Rusk, supra note 4, at 298.
168. See, e.g., John Hunter, A Simple Technique for Estimating an Allowance for Uncertain SeaLevel Rise, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 239, 240 (2011) (suggesting that present evidence links rising sea
levels to extreme weather events); IPCC, supra note 144, at 8 (finding that increasing occurrences of
extreme weather events implies greater risks on a regional scale); Claudia Tebaldi et al., Modelling Sea
Level Rise Impacts on Storm Surges Along US Coast, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Jan.–March 2012, at 1, 1
(comparing the local characteristics of margins of continental shelves).
169. See, e.g., ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 3.1, 4 (concluding that exposure of coastal areas to
sea-level rise is significant and will likely grow substantially); Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at
146, 165 (finding that melting ice sheets also greatly affect sea-level rise); Church & White, supra note
146, at 585 (acknowledging that sea-level rise will impact coastal populations); IPCC, supra note 144, at
2–4 (detailing scientific evidence in support of sea level rise); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note
146, at 8–9 (providing examples of large-scale natural events that are accelerating the rate of sea levelrise and how those events are connected).
170. ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 2.1, 3.1 (finding that, while projections and models are
limited, sea-level rise is nevertheless plausible given long-time scales and commitment to sea-level rise);
Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at 149–50 (finding great regional variability in the rates of sea-level
rise changes); Church & White, supra note 146, at 585–86 (explaining that global mean sea level is
expected to continue rising despite uncertain projections); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518
(highlighting the effect climate change has on coastal erosion).
171. See, e.g., Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at 150 (describing rates of variability in sealevel rise); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518 (highlighting the effect climate change has on
coastal erosion); Sallenger, supra note 139, at 884 (asserting sea-level rise has been relatively low on the
North American coast); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 9 (highlighting several
locations along the East Coast that are affected specifically because of their proximity to the Gulf
Stream).
172. See, e.g., SE. FLA. CLIMATE COMPACT CTYS., supra note 17, at 9 (examining the threat to
coastal resources and ecosystems in Florida).
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significant portions of the coastline in many states, including Florida. 173
This represents a different problem from the challenge of allocating risk in
disputes that affect only a small number of coastal landowners and a limited
stock of submerged lands held in public trust.
4. Homogeneity of Water Bodies
a. The Assumption: Changes in Oceans, Lakes, Rivers, and Streams All
Share the Same Characteristics
The ambulatory boundaries framework treats rivers, lakes, and oceans
similarly, with only subtle distinctions in the principles applied to them. 174
To the extent that common law distinguishes among water bodies in
applying accretion and avulsion, flowing rivers and streams constitute one
category (riparian), while lakes and oceans constitute another (littoral). 175
The fundamental failure to recognize significant differences among these
water bodies and the processes that change their contours may contribute to
the incoherence in the ambulatory boundaries framework that
commentators have frequently noted. 176 It may also explain the lack of
coherence in the rationales for the doctrine, given that the values at stake in
a lake, riverine, or coastal setting can be quite different. 177 Notably, for
example, cases involving lakes and oceans rarely involve state boundaries,
while some of the highest profile cases applying the doctrine involve rivers
along state boundaries. 178

173. See FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 30 (reporting 61% of Florida’s beaches were
designated as eroding as of August 2016); Baptiste, supra note 15 (noting the different types of effects
Florida has faced and will face in the future because of sea-level rise); see also Cazenave & Llovel,
supra note 146, at 150 (showing the rising sea level on U.S. coasts).
174. See generally POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] n.11 (discussing traditional littoral and
riparian values and the differential application of the doctrine of accretion); TIFFANY, supra note 54,
§ 995 (treating “bank,” “shore,” “margin,” and “edge” similarly insofar as setting the mean high- and
low-water mark).
175. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] 7.
176. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 321, 354 (providing different views that commentators
have pieced together to form a coherent theory that meets their needs). For example, the explanation that
is almost always used to explain the rationale for the rule governing avulsive events involves a river
cutting through an oxbow or S-curve suddenly and unexpectedly. This scenario creates problems not
presented in coastal settings.
177. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] n.11 (citing Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 S.2d
495 (La. 1991)) (finding that riparian owners whose properties abut streams or rivers benefit from
accretion, while riparian owners with properties abutting navigable waters, such as bays, do not).
178. See., e.g., Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23, 23, 24 (1904) (resolving a dispute about state
boundaries along the Missouri River); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 370 (1892) (discussing rivers in
relation to state boundaries).
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b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is a Distinctively Coastal Process
Sea-level rise challenges the idea that a single doctrine should address
changes in all riparian settings, particularly in the traditional doctrinal
pairing of coastal and lakefront properties. Sea-level rise will affect
estuaries at the mouths of rivers and perhaps some lakes that drain into
coastal waters. 179 However, in general, it will affect only the boundaries of
properties in close proximity to the coast. 180 This new reality supports
reconsidering the continued application of existing common law doctrines
or, at the least, tailoring their application in contexts where sea-level rise
will be a factor.
The unified doctrine is not only unsuited to an era of sea-level rise; its
development may also have been distorted by the different settings
represented in case law. The vast majority of factual settings in cases
applying avulsion are riverine. 181 This raises the question of whether the
doctrine makes sense in the coastal context. Moreover, several important
riverine cases elaborating on the avulsion doctrine implicated state or other
jurisdictional boundaries. 182 This raises a number of considerations not
implicated in cases involving the sudden submergence or erosion of coastal
land. This article argues for careful consideration of whether the law of
avulsion should apply in coastal settings generally, especially in light of the
changes associated with sea-level rise.

179. The Great Lakes and their connection to the Atlantic Ocean through the St. Lawrence River
may provide an example.
180. E.g., ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 3.1, 3.2.3 (finding that regions with “extensive[,] highly
populated coastal lowlands” bear a disproportionate amount of damage from sea-level rise); Cazenave &
Llovel, supra note 146, at 150 (showing that sea-level rise is more pervasive along the southern coasts
of the United States); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518 (finding that sea levels are rising
faster in subsiding coasts); Sallenger, supra note 139, at 884 (finding that the northeast hotspot (NEH)
of accelerated sea-level rise is unique across North American coasts between Key West, Florida and St.
John’s, Newfoundland. Sea-level rate differences (SLRDs) in the NEH are three to four times larger
than global SLRDs); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 9 (noting that coastal areas in
particular have experienced an increase in flood frequency and will continue to do so at an accelerated
rate).
181. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311 n.24, 315, 351 nn.257 & 259 (referencing cases
that involve avulsion in rivers).
182. See, e.g., Missouri, 196 U.S. at 35 (noting additional cases that have involved the problem
of avulsion in determining state boundary lines); Nebraska, 143 U.S. at 370 (involving a boundary
dispute between Nebraska and Iowa resulting from changes in the course of the Missouri River).
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B. How Archaic Factual Assumptions Undermine the Rationales for the
Ambulatory Boundaries Framework
Part II.A illustrates that the four factual assumptions on which the
ambulatory boundaries framework is grounded are no longer true. This
section considers how the changed factual reality directly affects the
viability of the rationales that courts have offered to justify applying the
doctrine. It highlights how the changed reality resulting from sea-level rise
undermines or transforms the five rationales for applying the ambulatory
boundaries framework.
1. De Minimis Non Curat Lex and Archaic Assumptions About
Predictability, Frequency, and Scope of Change
The fact that sea-level rise is predictable, ongoing, and geographically
pervasive erodes the factual foundation for the de minimis rationale.
Commentators closely identified the de minimis rationale with the doctrines
of accretion and erosion, although cases applying the avulsion doctrine
have cited to it as well. 183 Thus, the de minimis rationale seems to justify
having a special set of rules for boundaries at the water’s edge, rather than
to justify applying the accretion or avulsion doctrines.
As noted above, 184 the facts of the cases in which judges first
articulated the de minimis rationale suggest that the focus was not on
whether the acreage involved in a particular case was minimal or
substantial, but whether the overall effect on the sovereign’s interests was
de minimis. 185 The ongoing and geographically pervasive impacts of sealevel rise and the substantial costs they will impose eliminate the factual
foundation for considering the changes occurring along our coasts as de
minimis. 186
Moreover, given that courts used the de minimis rationale to justify
applying both the erosion and avulsion doctrines, the rationale cannot offer
courts real guidance on how to resolve a case under the ambulatory
boundaries framework. Thus, this rationale no longer seems relevant in the
183. Some of the early commentators on avulsion referenced by Sax posited that avulsion might
be distinguished by the larger scale of the change experienced. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 327
(describing Hale’s standpoint). However the case law has ultimately not borne this out.
184. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the de minimis rationale).
185. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313.
186. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 988 So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla.
2008) (concluding that critical erosion occurring on half of Florida’s beaches is hardly de minimis). To
the extent that a court seeks to apply the framework, perhaps this rationale might come into play in
special settings where the impact could be viewed as de minimis.
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context of sea-level rise. The changed facts associated with sea-level rise
undermine its utility and explanatory power.
2. Fairness and Archaic Assumptions About Predictability, Directionality,
Frequency, Scope of Change, and Homogeneity of Waterfront Contexts
Courts using the fairness rationale to support the doctrine of accretion
ground their decisions on the notion of reciprocity of risk—that coastal
landowners risk both gains and losses in owning property close to the
sea.187 Reciprocity justifies awarding coastal landowners land the sea
exposed in order to offset the risk of loss from inundation. 188 In cases of
accretion, reciprocity of risk justifies awarding newly exposed land that
belonged to the sovereign to coastal landowners. 189 In addition, it similarly
justifies awarding newly submerged land to the sovereign. This evokes a
Rawlsian sort of fairness. Behind the veil of ignorance, courts operate under
the premise that there is no information on who might gain or lose in the
future. 190 Because the assumptions of bidirectionality and unpredictability
are no longer true, the notion of achieving fairness by allowing landowners
to assume reciprocal risks is less convincing.
In an era of sea-level rise, there will be relatively fewer instances of
newly exposed land. 191 Thus, the fairness rationale argues even more
strongly for awarding newly exposed land to landowners to compensate for
losses that will become more frequent. Indeed, in a context of sea-level rise,
an ambulatory boundary will frequently cause the landowner to bear the
risk of loss with little prospect of reciprocal gain. However, coastal
landowners are not alone in bearing these new risks of loss. 192 All taxpayers
will be sharing much of the cost that sea-level rise imposes, including:
subsidized federal flood insurance for coastal landowners and landowners
in flood-prone areas; disaster preparation and response costs that protect
and assist coastal landowners disproportionately; and increased costs of

187. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 308, 320–22.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 312.
190. See Giancarlo Panagia, Tot Capita Tot Sententiae: An Extension or Misapplication of
Rawlsian Justice, 110 PENN ST. L.R. 283, 285–86 (2005) (explaining that when acting behind the veil of
ignorance, individuals must act in the interest of all because they do not know which group they will
represent).
191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (finding that the United States is likely to lose
more of its coasts as the sea level rises).
192. Thomas Ruppert & Carly Grimm, Drowning in Place: Local Government Costs and
Liabilities for Flooding Due to Sea-Level Rise, 87 FLA. BAR J. 9, 31–32 (2013) (explaining how noncoastal landowners will still be affected by sea-level rise through mitigation efforts).
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maintaining coastal areas before permanent inundation. 193 These costs inure
to the benefit of coastal landowners disproportionately. 194
The change in dynamic that sea-level rise creates—transforming a winlose equation to one that is largely lose-lose for all involved 195—affects the
extent to which any single principle will achieve fairness. Coastal
landowners’ property interests will generally be adversely affected by an
ambulatory boundary, while the public’s interest will suffer under a fixed
boundary. 196 Thus, courts should arguably rethink how best to achieve
fairness in an era of sea-level rise and whether the notion of “reciprocity of
risk” has any continuing relevance.
The second way courts have invoked the fairness rationale
distinguishes cases of rapid change from gradual change. 197 Applying the
avulsion doctrine to sudden change is often justified by expressed concern
for the harsh surprises associated with sudden events, such as hurricanes. 198
The idea is that landowners experience sudden, perceptible loss as a greater
loss than a gradual, imperceptible one. Therefore, landowners should be
protected from sudden losses and given the opportunity to reclaim their
lands, but if and only if the lands are lost rapidly. 199 However, the reason
that a sudden loss evokes sympathy and a sense of unfairness is not just
because a surprise causes an emotional shock. A sudden and unpredictable
loss entails lack of warning and an inability to prepare for, mitigate, or
avoid the loss. 200 This underlies the notion that fairness supports the
avulsion doctrine.
The predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, and pervasive qualities of
sea-level rise, therefore, undermine this fairness justification for applying
the avulsion doctrine even when the change to the coast occurs within a
short timeframe. Sudden erosion wrought by storms is no longer a random,
totally unpredictable, isolated, and anomalous event for coastal
193. Id.
194. Id. (highlighting that expenditures on coastal protections will force counties to incur great
costs at the expense of other possible county projects).
195. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b (expanding on the losses associated with inundation).
196. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 367–68 (describing the effects of sea-level rise in
differing boundary regimes).
197. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 337 (examining the early rationale for the doctrine of
avulsion).
198. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114
(Fla. 2008) (explaining that the hardship of removing title from an owner due to avulsive events is
against the public interest).
199. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 308, 324 (arguing that the gradualness of the shift in
boundary diminishes the loser’s sense of loss); Rusk, supra note 4, at 299–300 (explaining that courts
hesitate to shift boundary lines and burden private land after avulsive events).
200. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (explaining the mitigating purpose of the
doctrine of avulsion).
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landowners. 201 Many landowners already have firsthand experience with
the combined impact of sea-level rise and climate change on storm surges,
and none can be unaware of the experiences along large portions of the
United States’ coastline in recent years. 202 Landowners also have access to
extensive information regarding likely future impacts. 203 Those who decide
to retain coastal property also have sufficient knowledge and opportunity to
take steps to mitigate or insure against the associated risks. 204 Many coastal
landowners are building sea walls, elevating structures, and taking other
measures to try to prolong the useful life of their properties, demonstrating
their awareness of the threats. 205
This reality undermines the rationale for applying the avulsion doctrine
—allowing coastal landowners to reclaim submerged land because of the
hardships occasioned by an unpredictable change. Thus, in an era of sealevel rise, factors—like the timing of the landowner’s investments and the
landowner’s actual or imputed knowledge of ongoing erosion of a
property—may be relevant to the analysis of fairness. Similarly, fairness
could take account of the degree of hardship an ambulatory boundary
would cause, including available statutory opportunities for the landowner
to protect remaining structures. 206

201. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 88.
202. E.g., Alvarez & Robles, supra note 148 (chronicling efforts counties in Florida have made
to prepare for rising sea levels); Urbina, supra note 148 (chronicling the increasing homeowner wariness
about purchasing coastal properties).
203. There are free, publicly available mapping tools. See Office for Coastal Mgmt., NOAA’s
Sea Level Rise Viewer, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/slr (last updated Nov. 3, 2017)
(showing growing sea-level rise in an interactive map format); Surging Seas Risk Finder and Mapping
Tools, CLIMATE CENTRAL, http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (providing
interactive tools to see maps of areas that are below sea levels and experience flooding). There are also
federal databases and tools that enable landowners to determine their flood exposure, see whether they
are in a designated flood zone, and discover the meaning of that designation. See Office for
Coastal Mgmt., NOAA Coastal Flood Exposure Map, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/fl
ood-exposure.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2017) (showing coastal flood exposure in an interactive map);
FEMA Flood Map Service Center, FEMA, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/search (last visited Dec. 2, 2017)
(providing tools to locate specific flood maps by address). In addition, there is a growing cadre of
private consultants who will assess present and future flooding risk for coastal property owners or
prospective purchasers. E.g., About Coastal Risk Consulting, COASTAL RISK CONSULTING,
http://coastalriskconsulting.com/about (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
204. See, e.g., Ruppert, supra note 31, at 90 (discussing certain permitting guidelines that give
property owners notice of the risk of sea-level rise).
205. See id. at 97 (explaining that shore-armor permitting and beach nourishment efforts are
attempts to insulate properties from sea-level rise).
206. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (reaffirming the relevance of preexisting
conditions and landowner knowledge about the condition of the property and its likely uses in
determining the appropriate denominator under the Takings Clause). Justice Kennedy noted that the
physical characteristics of the property and the likelihood of regulation are relevant to the assessment of
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Thus, the situation for coastal landowners today is distinct from the
paradigmatic case frequently invoked to justify applying the avulsion
doctrine as a matter of fairness—the sympathetic case of the riverine
property owner whose property becomes divided overnight by a river that
suddenly and unpredictably cut through an oxbow or moved to a new
channel. 207 This has always been the classic case for applying the avulsion
doctrine; the fairness rationale justifies providing the landowner
opportunity to reclaim the property that is now across the river.208 Unlike
the unlucky riverine landowner, coastal landowners today have notice and
ability to decide whether they wish to continue to bear the risks associated
with owning coastal property. 209 Thus, the fairness justification offered to
support the avulsion doctrine no longer makes sense. Although fairness
may dictate that the avulsion doctrine should apply in a limited universe of
cases, it will be an increasingly weak rationale as the effects of sea-level
rise become more pronounced and widely experienced.
Moreover, the “surprise” narrative that justified the landowner’s right
to reclaim land after sudden changes is also no longer accurate. The new
reality that sea-level rise poses means that making broad generalizations
about the fairness of losing land to the ocean (as a result of sudden and
perceptible changes, as opposed to a gradual change) is no longer possible.

the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, which in turn influence the denominator
determination. Id. at 1945–46.
207. Compare Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 88 (describing the situation of present-day
coastal landowners), with Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 343–44 (describing the difficulties faced by a
riparian owner on the banks of the Missouri River). See also Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 192, at 31–
32 (noting the inevitable likelihood that maintaining essential public services in many coastal areas
subject to regular inundation will become impossible or impracticable).
208. See, e.g., Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351 (describing state of law as relegating
avulsion to a minor role, except where there is a shift of a river into a new channel or in the case of a
short-term change); see id. at 353 (recommending that the rule of accretion apply with a handful of
exceptions, including a river that shifts to a new channel or cuts through an oxbow).
209. It is notable that property values have only recently begun to show signs of incorporating
this risk. See Urbina, supra note 148 (noting that the real estate industry is slowly awakening to the need
to incorporate risks of catastrophic damage from climate change into their pricing). In assessing the
fairness of any given rule or outcome, it seems fair to consider that landowners have had an opportunity
to exit the coastal property market and have not chosen to do so. While some may not have the resources
to do so, given the large number of vacation and rental properties along much of Florida’s coast, many
clearly have the financial ability to do so but choose not to. In contrast, in locations where low-income
and otherwise vulnerable populations live in coastal areas, fairness should remain a central, relevant
consideration.
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3. Protection of the Sovereign/Public Interest and Archaic Assumptions
About Predictability, Directionality, Frequency, and Scope of Change
As Professor Sax notes, early English common law valued protecting
the sovereign’s interest in previously submerged lands. 210 Specifically,
early British courts and commentators noted that privatizing large segments
of coastal land might impair the king’s strategic interest in controlling the
coast. 211 For this reason, courts took pains to clarify that interfering with
sovereign interests could override other factors supporting a shift in title. 212
This rationale of protecting the sovereign/public interest remains
relevant in an era of sea-level rise. 213 The sovereign continues to have a
strong interest in the outcome of littoral boundary determinations and
control over submerged lands held in trust for the public. 214 However, the
nature of the sovereign’s interest has significantly changed.
Today, the sovereign’s interest in land that becomes submerged
because of erosion is less likely to be military or strategic, and more likely
to reflect the contours of the public trust doctrine—emphasizing public use
for navigation, bathing and fishing, and protecting public health, safety, and
the environment. 215 In Florida, the state constitution, statutes, and case law
reflect the strength of the state’s interest in preserving a foreshore that is
accessible to the public and sandy beaches that are open for public use. 216
The new reality of predictable, unidirectional, and geographically
pervasive change amplifies this rationale’s importance. The public interests
and values associated with the foreshore are at considerable risk in an era of

210. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312 (discussing the sovereign’s right to rapidly
exposed littoral land).
211. Id. at 325.
212. See id. at 312 (justifying transfer of title to private owners during accretion based on the de
minimis rationale).
213. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 84–85 (describing the public trust doctrine and its
relevance to properties likely to be submerged due to sea-level rise).
214. See id. (offering an example of the state’s interest in control over submerged lands).
215. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 323 n.15 (1973) (“The extent of the
State’s interests should not be narrowly construed because it is denominated a navigational purpose.”).
216. See FLA CONST. art. X, § 11 (providing that the state holds title in public trust all lands
under navigable lands, including beaches below the MHWL); FLA. STAT. § 161.101 (2012) (recognizing
beach erosion as a statewide problem and creating a state-initiated program of beach restoration and
nourishment); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974) (“No part of
Florida is more exclusively hers, nor more properly utilized by her people than her beaches. And the
right of the public of access to, and enjoyment of, Florida’s oceans and beaches has long been
recognized by this Court.”); White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939) (“We love the oceans which
surround our State. We . . . enjoy bathing in their refreshing waters. The constant enjoyment of this
privilege of thus using the ocean and its fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove sufficient to
establish it as an American common law right . . . .”).
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predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, and geographically pervasive
erosion. 217 The sovereign interest in and duty to protect the public’s right to
bathe, fish, navigate, and walk on the foreshore is at risk if there is no
publicly owned foreshore or—in a more extreme case—if members of the
public are separated from the water by private land (both dry and
submerged). 218 Occasional, episodic, and bidirectional changes of limited
geographic scope do not pose a comparable threat to these interests. 219
The state also has an interest in protecting other increasingly
recognized ecological values of the area where dry land and sea meet.220
Dunes and other coastal features also provide natural protection against
storms and flooding, not just for littoral property, but also for property and
citizens living inland. 221 If these naturally protective features are eroding,
the state may have a strong interest in restoring them, especially when
restoration is feasible and cost-effective. Thus, control over newly
submerged lands may be critical to the state’s ability to protect public
health, safety, and the environment.
In eras when coastal change was occasional and limited, the impact on
the sovereign’s interest was correspondingly small. 222 Thus, consideration
of the sovereign’s interest was, in some sense, pro forma in the early
cases. 223 Today, the ongoing and pervasive change along the coast
intensifies the public interest and brings this consideration to the fore. 224
This analysis suggests that the facts associated with sea-level rise intensify
217. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645.
218. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 356.
219. Id. at 325 (discussing how de minimis changes did not threaten the sovereign’s interests).
220. In Florida, the area below the MHWL can include nesting habitat for sea turtles and critical
habitat for other species. Blair Witherington et al., Sea Turtle Responses to Barriers on Their Nesting
Beach, 401 J. EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 1, 1 (2011).
221. See generally OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS & WATERSHEDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, 842-R-15-002, GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARISE DURING MUNICIPAL
OPERATIONS, CASE STUDY: NORTH AND SOUTH RIVERS WATERSHED ASSOCIATION RAIN GARDENS
(2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/green_infrastructure_roadshow.p
df (examining the impact of coastal-improvement projects on water quality); JEFFREY ODEFEY ET AL.,
AMERICAN RIVERS, BANKING ON GREEN: A LOOK AT HOW GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE CAN SAVE
MUNICIPALITIES MONEY AND PROVIDE ECONOMIC BENEFITS COMMUNITY-WIDE 24 (2012), https://s3.
amazonaws.com/american-rivers-website/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/06142720/banking-on-green-rep
ort.pdf (“Naturally occurring ‘green infrastructure’ such as dune systems, wetlands (also known as
living shorelines), and salt marshes can provide water storage and retention areas, mitigate tidal surges,
reduce coastal erosion, and help to alleviate coastal flooding.”).
222. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313 (discussing the original rationale behind the
accretion doctrine).
223. See id. at 308, 309 (referring to views on historical deference to the sovereign Crown).
224. See Jen Van Allen, Coastal Access: “Interests in Tension,” ISLANDS INST. 2, 3 (Oct. 24,
2016), http://www.islandinstitute.org/working-waterfront/coastal-access-‘interests-tension’ (diving into
current public access issues in Maine).
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the nature of the sovereign’s interests. The pace and magnitude of the
change, coupled with the ongoing, pervasive trend toward inundation
clearly implicates a primary sovereign interest—protecting public safety. 225
Unidirectional, predictable, ongoing, and pervasive change also poses a
particular threat to the sovereign’s interest in protecting public beach and
water access and ecological systems.
Moreover, the sovereign’s interests have weight because of not only its
police power and duty to protect the public, but also the sovereign’s
interests as a landowner. 226 Joseph Sax highlighted the implications of
considering the sovereign’s role not just as regulator, but also as trustee of
sovereign submerged lands with a duty to protect the public’s interest in
these lands and navigation. 227 This threefold strand of sovereign interests
may offer the most robust grounds for courts and litigants seeking to adapt
the doctrines to the realities of sea-level rise. This rationale provides a
compelling reason to favor ambulatory boundaries that move as the shore
erodes. This would better enable the sovereign to protect these various
interests and fulfill its duties.
4. Productive Use of Land/Social Utility and Archaic Assumptions About
Directionality, Frequency, and Scope of Change
A theme in the cases awarding private landowners newly accreted
lands is their ability to make productive use of the newly created or exposed
land.228 Commentators and courts have adverted to the value of having a
clear owner who can use the land or of having an existing owner who
currently makes productive use of the land. 229 However, disputes over
ownership of submerged lands weaken the relevance of this rationale. Cases
of newly created or exposed land implicate the value of productive use of
land—a value that the accretion doctrine advanced. 230 Given that inundation
of property is a fact that will predominate in an era of sea-level rise, the
value of productive use and ownership of newly exposed or created land is
not implicated in the same way.
Of course, in cases of erosion or submersion, landowners can still
assert an interest in productive use of their land. Indeed, the avulsion
225. See also Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 52, 56, 76–77 (noting how state interest in
public safety might be met with legal obstacles).
226. See Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 641–43.
227. Id. at 651.
228. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 323–25, 333 (showing how productive use of land can
correlate to awarded land via accretion).
229. Id.
230. Id.
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doctrine envisions that the landowner will somehow reclaim submerged
lands, if reclamation is feasible within a reasonable time. 231 This aligns with
both the fairness rationale and the productive-use rationale. Presumably, a
landowner would only invest in reclaiming lands if she was using or
believed she could use these lands productively. However, when inundation
occurs because of significant, ongoing, and geographically pervasive sealevel rise, the landowners’ desire to reclaim and use inundated land is not
innocuous. In many settings, reclamation may be socially undesirable and
create significant externalities that other landowners and the public will
bear. 232 In some cases, it may put public health and safety at risk. 233
Moreover, allowing landowners to use this land could interfere with
navigation, water access, and other strongly protected public trust rights. 234
Thus, the notion of productive use of land takes on a very different aspect
in the context of sea-level rise.
As noted above, the rationale of promoting productive use of land by
ensuring that all lands have an owner has not been prominent in cases of
erosion. 235 Courts typically invoked the rationale only in cases involving
newly formed dry land that landowners could use productively. 236 This
rationale falls away when applied in the context of sea-level rise, as in other
cases involving erosion.
Alternatively, one could argue that, while the underlying rationale
remains relevant, the context of sea-level rise turns it on its head. Instead of
providing a rationale for allowing littoral landowners to claim newly
formed land, the considerable social value associated with public use of
submerged lands provides an argument against allowing landowners to

231. Id. at 307–08 (providing historical context on why avulsion has different rules then
accretion); see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 (Fla.
2008) (stating that the doctrine of avulsion recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land within a
reasonable time”).
232. For example, in many settings, landowners’ only feasible option is to construct a seawall to
reclaim and protect submerged areas. Anne Schindler, Building a Great Wall—on Our Eastern Border,
FIRSTCOAST NEWS (Oct. 20, 2016, 9:21 PM), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/local/building-agreat-wall-on-our-eastern-border/339378027. Seawalls frequently accelerate the pace of erosion on
adjacent properties as well as any beach in front of them. Id.
233. Climate Change Impacts to U.S. Coasts Threaten Public Health, Safety and Economy,
NOAA (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2013/20130125_coastalclimateimpacts.ht
ml (looking at direct and indirect effects of climate change on coastal communities).
234. See Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 644 (explaining that landowners making
reclamation efforts have a duty to provide public access to the water).
235. See discussion supra Part II.B (considering how these factual changes undermine the
rationales that supported the application of the ambulatory boundaries framework).
236. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 324–25 (explaining the justification for rewarding
accreted land to existing owners).
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retain control after lands are submerged. 237 Of course, one can also argue
that the right accorded by the avulsion doctrine in cases of sudden and
dramatic change preserves the landowner’s ability to make productive use
of the submerged land through reclamation. However, as sea level rises,
reclamation will become practically impossible and, in some settings,
dangerous. 238 Thus, even if this rationale survives in the ambulatory
boundaries framework, it offers less support for the avulsion doctrine than it
does outside the sea-level rise context.
5. Access to Water and Archaic Assumptions About Directionality of
Change
The final rationale offered to support the ambulatory boundaries
framework is preserving littoral landowners’ access to water. As noted
above, this has become the predominant rationale of concern under United
States case law. 239 However, the concern that landowners may lose access
to the water arises only in scenarios involving newly exposed or accreted
lands placed in public ownership. 240 In a context of unidirectional change—
where land primarily and persistently erodes—the landowner retains access
to the water regardless of whether the boundary is static or dynamic. 241 In
other words, access to water is no longer an issue. Thus, the rationale that
modern American courts rely on most prominently to justify applying the
ambulatory boundaries framework is of questionable relevance in the
context of sea-level rise.

237. Indeed, a rationale offered by early commentators to justify the doctrine of accretion—that
the newly created land became in fact part of the land, so it made sense that it should become part of the
tract at law—would argue for making newly submerged lands part of the waters rather than maintaining
them as part of the land. See id. at 320 n.76 (describing commentary by Lord Hale).
238. See also Susumu Yasuda et al., Characteristics of Liquefaction in Tokyo Bay Area by the
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, 52 SOILS & FOUND. 793, 794 (2013) (describing the dangers of
reclaimed land in Japan after the 2011 earthquake).
239. See supra Part II.B.5 (collecting cases and treatises that identify this as the most prevalent
rationale under U.S. law).
240. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 988 So. 2d 1102, 1105–
07, 1121 (Fla. 2008) (illustrating how beach restoration and renourishment may still lead to landowner
claims of denial of access to water). In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the landowners’
claim that beach renourishment pursuant to Florida’s statutory scheme unconstitutionally took the
landowner’s right of access. Id.
241. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 346 (concluding that boundaries should follow a river’s
movement, no matter the form of the movement).
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III. CLEARING AWAY THE DEBRIS: DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LAW IN
A POST-AMBULATORY BOUNDARIES LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Part II described how five factual predicates for the development and
application of ambulatory boundaries framework are absent or unfounded
in an era of sea-level rise. Part II also described how these factual changes
affect the viability of the rationales that supported applying the ambulatory
boundaries framework. It illustrated how the coastal context resulting from
sea-level rise fundamentally transforms the fairness and public interest
rationales. It also detailed how the de minimis, social-utility, and access-towater rationales retain limited, if any, relevance. This section turns to the
doctrinal implications of the changed factual reality of sea-level rise and
outlines two possible paths for courts to take in resolving coastal boundary
issues in this changed factual context.
The genius of common law is its ability to evolve as it encounters new
situations. This section begins by addressing the general question of the
circumstances under which common law judges can and should find that
changed facts support changed outcomes. This discussion uses the term
“doctrinally relevant” to describe facts that affect either the choice of the
appropriate and applicable rule in a given case, or the outcome of applying
a given rule. Both explicit, factual predicates for a given legal rule and facts
that bear on the rationales for applying the relevant legal rule can be
doctrinally relevant.
A change in a doctrinally relevant fact can affect a court’s ruling on
two different levels. At a superficial level, it can affect the court’s decision
on how to apply the rule, and potentially affect the outcome of the case. 242
In other words, the same rule can apply in two cases, but the presence or
absence of a particular fact may change the court’s analysis, and may even
determine a different outcome.
The second more fundamental level at which facts can affect a court’s
decision is when the presence or absence of a particular fact affects the
selection of the applicable law. 243 To give a very basic example, in criminal
law, if the case involves unauthorized entry into a home and removal of an
object, the offense is generally burglary. 244 However, if the case involves
authorized entry and removal of an object, the offense is typically theft, but
242. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955) (holding that absence of
a finding of intent to cause harm supports a conclusion that no battery occurred).
243. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1954) (finding that circumstances of the case
did not warrant application of the rule governing enforcement of a contract made while intoxicated, but
fell instead under the general rule governing contracts).
244. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 (2017) (defining burglary).
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not burglary. 245 The presence or absence of unauthorized entry determines
the applicable rule. This occurs when facts are elements of a given legal
claim. It can also occur even where the fact is not an identified predicate or
element of a claim. 246
Therefore, if a court determines that the effects of sea-level rise
constitute doctrinally relevant facts, it must subsequently determine how the
facts affect the analysis. The court can: (a) factor the effects of sea-level
rise into its analysis and potentially reach a different result under the
ambulatory boundaries framework; or (b) recognize that the effects of sealevel rise warrant applying different legal principles from the traditional
ambulatory boundaries framework. After a discussion of how courts
determine which facts have doctrinal relevance in Part III.A, Parts III.B and
III.C explore these two approaches. Part III.B considers a first option: the
conservative approach. Under this approach, courts will apply the
ambulatory boundaries framework, but explicitly recognize that the effects
of sea-level rise necessitate changes in how the doctrines are applied. This
will align the ambulatory boundaries framework with the rationales that
support its application.
Part III.C considers a second, more comprehensive approach. A court
could conclude that the common law framework is, by its terms,
inapplicable in this new setting. It could then apply the remaining
substantive body of law that governs property boundaries and ownership,
public trust, and submerged lands without the overlay of the ambulatory
boundaries framework. Part III.C then examines how these bodies of law,
composed of constitutional, statutory, and common laws, might apply to
coastal properties in the absence of the ambulatory boundaries framework.
Finally, Part III.D anticipates some of the arguments against adapting
or supplanting the traditional framework, including the argument that the
latter approach constitutes a change in settled law that denies property
owners due process, or constitutes a “judicial taking” without just
compensation.
A. The Relevance of Changed Facts: What’s a Court to Do?
A basic premise of our common law tradition is that judges decide
cases by applying the principle of stare decisis. They employ the techniques
of reasoning-by-analogy and distinguishing cases to determine whether a

245. Id. § 3921 (defining theft).
246. See M.B.W. Sinclair, The Semantics of Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L. REV. 373,
378–80 (1986) (explaining what predicates are and how they apply in a legal context).
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prior decision is binding precedent to a subsequent case. 247 This requires
identifying “doctrinally relevant” facts, such that the presence or absence of
the fact affects the choice of rule or the outcome of the case when the court
applies the rule. 248 Thus, judges confronted with two cases—only one of
which involves a doctrinally relevant fact—may arrive at different
decisions either because (1) different rules govern the two cases; or
(2) because the same rule, properly applied to the facts, produces divergent
results.
Courts may find two different categories of facts doctrinally relevant.
The first category is composed of facts that constitute elements of a
particular rule. The second category is composed of facts so critical to
applying the rule that they can affect the choice of rule or outcome, even
though they are not elements of the rule. In the first category, the fact is
already recognized as a requisite for applying the prior decision or rule. 249
In the second category, the fact’s relationship to the rationale underlying the
rule determines its significance to the outcome. 250 The argument elaborated
in more detail below is that, when confronted with the changed reality of
sea-level rise, courts applying the ambulatory boundaries framework should
find that the effects of sea-level rise are facts that fall into the second
category and are therefore doctrinally relevant.
Under stare decisis, courts are bound to apply the applicable law
similarly to cases involving similar facts. 251 However, where doctrinally
relevant facts differ in two cases, courts may decide: (1) that the same legal
principle or rule applies, but factual distinctions warrant a different
outcome; or (2) that a different legal principle or rule applies to the two
cases. 252 In other words, courts employ the techniques of reasoning-byanalogy and distinguishing cases at two distinct levels of application:
application of the rule to the facts and selection of the relevant rule. 253
In the first situation, a court distinguishes two cases because it
identified a material factual difference from a prior decision that affects
247. See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 457
(1975) (explaining the history of precedent).
248. Id. at 356 (commenting on the different ways that a court may decide a case, despite
sometimes having similar facts).
249. E.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955) (stating that intent to cause
harm is a requirement for battery, no matter the circumstances or character of that intent).
250. E.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1954) (finding that the evidence did not
support the conclusion that the defendant was sufficiently intoxicated, to warrant application of the rule
invalidating contracts made while unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument
executed).
251. Jones, supra note 247, at 456.
252. Id. at 456–57.
253. Id. at 458.

134

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 42:089

how a particular principle or rule applies to the case before it. 254 In such a
case, the court has already identified a legal doctrine or principle that
applies to both cases. Thus, the factual difference does not affect that
determination. However, the court may conclude that material factual
differences warrant a different analysis and outcome. 255 For example,
consider a case in which one landowner (P) claims that a boundary has been
modified by estoppel. Assume that the neighboring landowner (D)
expressly permitted P to use land within the actual boundaries of D’s
property up to a fence D built that was several feet inside D’s boundary.
Assume further that P used the land and subsequently built her own fence
abutting D’s fence. If D now seeks to preclude P from using the area within
D’s boundaries, P may claim that a new boundary at the fence line has been
established by estoppel.
A court might decide that—although a plaintiff proves the strict
elements of boundary-by-estoppel 256—material factual differences from
prior cases warrant distinguishing the situation. For example, the evidence
might show that D merely tried to be a good neighbor, reasonably believed
that P knew that D was merely granting a permissive use of D’s land, and
had no warning that P would build a fence. In such a case, a court might
decide that boundary-by-estoppel should not apply because the primary
rationale underlying estoppel is preventing wrongful conduct. Therefore,
innocent, good faith acts should not qualify. 257 Thus, the court might
conclude that, based on these facts and notwithstanding existing law, no
estoppel should be found. 258
Courts engage in a somewhat similar but distinct process when they
decide that a particular principle or rule applied in a prior case should not
be applied in a subsequent case because of factual differences between the
two cases. 259 This arises when a case arguably could be decided under
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. The elements for proving boundary–by-estoppel in a majority of jurisdictions are an
express or implied (by conduct) misrepresentation of the boundary by the party to be estopped, and
reliance on the misrepresentation by another party who lacks notice of the truth. Notice of the truth is
also required for the party to be estopped, but such notice can be actual or imputed. POWELL, supra note
6, § 68.04[5][a].
257. See, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1970) (reiterating that equitable
estoppel pleas are not sufficient when based on mistaken actions).
258. See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.04[2] (explaining how the rigorous factual requirements
negate potential estoppel claims); see, e.g., Benz v. St. Paul, 93 N.W. 1038, 1040 (Minn. 1903)
(declining to find boundary-by-estoppel where landowner to be estopped did not have actual knowledge
of where boundary was in relation to the house plaintiff built).
259. In their book, Reason in Law, Lief Carter and Thomas Burke term this “fact freedom.” LIEF
H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 28 (8th ed. 2010) (“We call judicial freedom to
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either of two legal principles or rules. 260 The court may find that relevant
factual differences between a prior and a subsequent case affect the court’s
decision as to which legal framework or principle should apply. 261 For
example, consider a case that can arguably be resolved under two different
property law principles, such as boundary-by-acquiescence and boundaryby-estoppel. 262 In this case, assume that our landowner (P) claims that the
boundary with a neighbor’s (D’s) property has been modified by
acquiescence. Again, assume that P used land up to a fence that ran several
feet inside D’s boundary. P might cite prior cases with similar facts (e.g., a
case where the actual owner acquiesced to P’s use of property up to an
existing fence that was not on the boundary) to support her claim. However,
a court could decide that the boundary-by-acquiescence doctrine does not
control the case because the length of time does not justify invoking the
underlying rationale of favoring diligent landowners and disfavoring
landowners who sleep on their rights. 263 Instead, the court might find that
the boundary-by-estoppel doctrine controls the case. 264 The presence or
absence of a particular fact—in the example, a sufficient length of time—
determines that different rules apply in two factually similar cases.
By analogy, the factual differences between current cases and earlier
cases resulting from sea-level rise could lead a court to conclude either:
(1) that the factual context of sea-level rise is doctrinally relevant and must
be considered in applying the ambulatory boundaries framework; or (2) that
the factual context of sea-level rise so directly and substantially undermines
the rationales for applying the ambulatory boundaries framework that they
should no longer apply. Part III.B illustrates the first path: a court applying
the ambulatory boundaries framework, but taking account of the doctrinally
relevant factual differences. Part III.C describes the second path: a court
determining that, in light of the factual differences, the ambulatory
boundaries framework does not apply in the context of sea-level rise.

choose the governing precedent by selectively sifting the facts of prior cases and weighing their relative
significance fact freedom.”).
260. Id. at 27.
261. Id. at 29.
262. Id. at 43–47.
263. See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.05[1][c] (explaining how firm time periods and other
technicalities may limit certain property claims); see Wells v. Williamson, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (Idaho
1990) (outlining the rationales underlying boundary-by-acquiescence).
264. See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.04[4] & [5][a] (stating practical location may establish
boundary-by-estoppel).
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B. Option One: Apply the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework with Explicit
Consideration of the Changed Factual Context
Because the changes presented by sea-level rise undermine and
transform the rationales for the ambulatory boundaries framework, courts
should, at least, take account of material facts in their analysis when
applying the law to the facts before them. In doing so, courts will find that,
in many cases, some of the rationales for applying the doctrine have
become irrelevant, such as the de minimis rationale, preservation of access
to water, and ensuring productive use of land. Other rationales, such as
fairness and protection of the public interest, remain relevant, but the
changed facts may turn the rationales on their heads, justifying completely
different results.
Confronted with this challenge, courts should acknowledge that the
facts presented in a context of sea-level rise are significantly different from
those that existed historically. In appropriate cases, courts could find that
these facts are different in ways that are materially relevant to applying the
ambulatory boundaries framework. These changed facts undermine key
assumptions and rationales for applying the specific doctrines. This section
offers a conservative approach for courts to account for these factual
changes. This approach focuses on the close connection between the
historic factual predicates and the rationales that support the doctrines. 265
Under this approach, a court explicitly acknowledges that the changed
context presented by sea-level rise requires rethinking the rationales that
support applying the ambulatory boundaries framework. 266 Therefore, in
applying the doctrines, the court considers how the changed facts affect the
underlying rationales. 267 Rationales that are no longer relevant in the
context of sea-level rise should not weigh in a court’s analysis. Rationales
that are still logically relevant may require courts to reconsider what result
will achieve the purpose of the doctrines, potentially affecting the analysis
and the outcome in an era of sea-level rise. If applying the doctrine directly
conflicts with the rationales that support the doctrine, courts should
reconsider the doctrine’s application to the facts of a particular case.

265. See Flatt, supra note 13, at 290–91 (enumerating a similar approach that seeks to adapt
statutes while maintaining a focus on the underlying purposes of the law).
266. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 47–48 (describing effects of accretion, avulsion and
erosion on littoral rights); Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 67–68 (explaining doctrines of
accretion, erosion and avulsion).
267. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46–48 (describing the effects of accretion, avulsion, and
erosion on littoral rights); Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 67–68 (explaining doctrines of
accretion, erosion, and avulsion).
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The analysis in Part II.B demonstrates that the de minimis, socialutility, and access-to-water rationales are no longer viable in the context of
sea-level rise. Arguably, courts should no longer recite these by rote or rely
on them to justify application of the ambulatory boundaries framework.
Focusing on the difficult, but important questions of fairness, and the broad
dimensions of public interest in coastal boundaries could produce a sounder
application of the ambulatory boundaries framework—one that better
achieves the doctrines’ purposes.
In some cases, rationales that are invoked by rote as supporting the
avulsion doctrine no longer support the same outcome. 268 Moreover, in
some cases, fairness may dictate overriding application of the accretion
doctrine. 269 By undertaking a meaningful and nuanced analysis of the
values that remain relevant, courts ensure that the doctrines serve their
purpose, rather than applying them mechanically and in ways that ignore
reality.
This proposed path represents a conservative approach to the challenge
that sea-level rise presents for the ambulatory boundaries framework, but it
could nevertheless dramatically affect outcomes. Rather than being bound
by the tyranny of the fast-slow distinction—with its significant information
costs, lack of predictability, seemingly arbitrary results, and doctrinal
incoherence—courts consider the values that the doctrines will serve:
fairness and protecting the public interest. Admittedly, these rationales
require courts to better define what achieves fairness and protects the public
interest in this new era, but courts face similar challenges in applying many
legal doctrines. 270 Through this method, courts will focus on protecting
meaningful social values, rather than determining whether and how much
of the erosion in a given case was caused by events observable by a person
unaided by technology, with all the absurd subsidiary questions that inquiry
entails. 271
C. Option Two: Set Aside the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework
Part III.B offers the conservative approach that a court might take
when confronted with the challenge of applying the ambulatory boundaries
268. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351–53 (describing cases where courts arbitrarily
followed doctrinal precedent and engaged in wasteful disputation).
269. Id.
270. E.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50
(1984) (describing how courts have moved away from traditional doctrines of autonomy and selfdetermination in contract law to fairness and social justice).
271. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 352–55 (proposing courts change their analysis of
property interests to include public use and environmental concerns).
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framework in the context of sea-level rise. This section outlines an
alternative and comprehensive path: reconsidering whether the ambulatory
boundaries framework is the proper law to apply in this context. If a court
concludes that the ambulatory boundaries framework does not apply to
cases of coastal erosion in an era of sea-level rise, the most logical and
arguably correct outcome is not to apply the framework. It is
unquestionably the province of courts to determine the applicable law. 272
Moreover, cases in which parties argue for the application of competing
legal frameworks to a single set of facts are common. Courts routinely
resolve these questions. 273 This part outlines what that approach might look
like.
If one removes the erosion-avulsion overlay from the picture, several
important bodies of law remain for courts to apply. 274 First, under real
property law, there are doctrines that determine boundaries to property. 275
As a general matter, the land descriptions in a deed typically establish
boundaries. 276 In general, those boundaries do not change absent voluntary
conveyance or the exercise of eminent domain. 277 This seems to suggest
applying a rigid rule that permanently fixes boundaries without regard to
the movement of the sea. However, common law has always included
numerous exceptions to this basic principle, including the doctrines of
adverse possession, post-conveyance agreement, estoppel, and
acquiescence. 278 These exceptions serve rationales similar to those
incorporated in the ambulatory boundaries framework—including fairness,
promoting the productive use of land, and efficiency. 279 Similarly, although
272. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS SERIES: CIVIL PROCEDURE 93, 96 (3d
ed., Thomas Reuters 2012).
273. See supra Part III.A (examining the use of precedent and stare decisis).
274. As noted earlier, these doctrines function as an overlay on background legal principles that
would otherwise require a transfer of property in order to change ownership of the disputed area. See
Sax, supra note 4, at 311–12 (discussing alternative bodies of law).
275. POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.02.
276. See TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 990 (“The language of the conveyance by which the land is
sought to be identified is usually referred to as the ‘description.’”). In Florida, there is also a statutory
overlay on the common law specifying that the seaward boundary of littoral property is the MHWL.
FLA. STAT. § 177.28 (2016). Subsection (2) of this provision states: “No provision of this part shall be
deemed to modify the common law of this state with respect to the legal effects of accretion, reliction,
erosion, or avulsion.” Id. § 177.28(2). This subsection would simply have no relevance if erosion and
avulsion did not apply to a given context.
277. POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.02.
278. Id. § 68.05[1][d].
279. Id. § 91.01[4] (explaining that adverse possession serves the policy of maintaining what
has become the status quo when the costs of wrestling the land may be too great); id. § 82.01[3]
(explaining that recording acts are aimed at protecting purchasers who had no prior notice of ownership
over the property and make property law self-executing and efficient); id.§§ 68.059[c], [d] (explaining
that the doctrine of recognition and acquisition aims to fulfill equitable policies); see also Sax,
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doctrines and statutes define the requirements for a valid voluntary transfer
of land, numerous exceptions that shift ownership without a valid transfer,
including estoppel, exist in a variety of situations. 280 Moreover, the
protections afforded bona fide purchasers under common law, as codified in
state recording statutes, 281 can override these rules and invalidate voluntary
transfers, or give effect to otherwise invalid transfers.
Thus, the law that defines boundaries and generally requires a
voluntary transfer or exercise of eminent domain to transfer title to land is
the first point of reference for courts seeking to determine the effect of a
changed coastline on property rights. 282 Ordinarily, absent circumstances
that require applying an exception, the existing law retains the boundaries
of a littoral property, notwithstanding the movement of the MHWL.
However, determining the location of a boundary generally begins with the
description of the property in the deed. 283
In Florida, the seaward boundary of littoral property is the MHWL. 284
Grants from the state that are not exceptional grants of sovereign
submerged lands cannot extend seaward of that line. 285 Boundaries
described with reference to the MHWL create a presumption that the parties
intended the boundary to be ambulatory. 286 Of course, there may be cases in
which a specific surveyed description of the MHWL at the time of the grant
is included in a deed. 287 In such cases, parties can argue that they intended
the boundary to remain fixed at that location. However, even when the
parties describe the specific geographic location of the water’s edge as the
boundary, courts frequently find that the parties intended to use the water’s
edge as the boundary, departing from the rule of strict construction. 288 Thus,
beginning from the property description, a court may find that the parties
generally intended to use the ambulatory water’s edge as the boundary,
instead of a fixed surveyed location. This argues in favor of a rule allowing

Accretion, supra note 4, at 323–24, 340 (explaining that ambulatory borders promote land efficiency
and fairness).
280. See TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1230 (explaining estoppel by deed); id. § 966 nn.4–5
(explaining estoppel based on part performance or reliance).
281. POWELL, supra note 6, § 82.01[3].
282. TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1220.
283. Id.
284. FLA. STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974).
285. See id. (providing that no waiver of state ownership over submerged lands is valid).
286. See id. § 253.12(9) (providing that state grant of tidally influenced lands are in the public
interest, and that the boundary between state and private land will be ambulatory).
287. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
2008) (highlighting how rising sea levels effectively change deeded land in coastal property rights).
288. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.03[1].
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the boundary to move, in order to respect the construction of the property
description in the deed or grant.
Because littoral property bounds on sovereign submerged lands, its
boundaries raise an additional question. How does or should the law treat
additions to the stock of submerged lands in the absence of the doctrines of
erosion and avulsion? The body of law governing these lands held in the
public trust is rich and extensive. 289 In Florida, both the state constitution
and common law clarify the special status accorded to sovereign submerged
lands. 290 The strength and importance of the public’s claim on these lands,
the limited right of the sovereign to convey them, and the importance of the
right of navigability and recreation in the ocean all suggest the need for
great caution in allowing newly submerged lands to pass into private
ownership.
Even the doctrine of avulsion, as it currently operates, gives
landowners a very qualified right in cases of erosion: the right to reclaim
newly submerged land. 291 Thus, to the extent that the law affords a littoral
landowner a right to newly submerged land under the avulsion doctrine,
that right is limited to reclaiming the submerged land within a reasonable
time. 292 The very limited nature of this right to reclaim is noteworthy.
Unlike in cases of accretion, the avulsion doctrine does not award title to
the littoral landowner; it merely provides a right to reclaim. 293 This protects
the strong public trust interest in the submerged lands. The strength of this
interest is also evinced in the Florida Constitution, which limits the
sovereign’s ability to alienate sovereign submerged lands absent a finding
that such alienation is in the public interest. 294 Both the strong constitutional
protection accorded sovereign submerged lands in Florida, and the weak
protection afforded the previous owner of newly submerged lands under the
ambulatory boundaries framework, point to allowing the boundary to move
landward as sea level rises.
289. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109–14 (discussing detailed history of public versus
private property issues).
290. See supra Part.I.A. (discussing the status of submerged lands under Florida common law
and Florida statutes).
291. TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 666.
292. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (“[W]hen an avulsive event leads to the loss of
land, the doctrine of avulsion recognizes the affected property owner’s right to reclaim the lost land
within a reasonable time.”).
293. In New York, the right to reclaim is stronger. See New York v. Realty Assocs., 176 N.E.
171, 172 (N.Y. 1931) (accepting the doctrine that sudden submergence does not divest the private owner
of title pending reclamation; title remains in the riparian owner).
294. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (“Sale of [sovereign submerged] lands may be authorized . . . only
when in the public interest. Private use of [these] lands may be authorized by law, but only when not
contrary to the public interest.”).
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Moreover, allowing landowners to exclude the public from expanses of
the wet sand area, and eventually even areas below the mean low-water
mark, would inevitably interfere with public rights to navigate, bathe, fish,
and otherwise enjoy the waters of the state. The primacy and importance of
these rights is well established. 295 If these public trust rights do not
sufficiently justify ensuring that submerged lands remain in public
ownership, the state’s economic dependence on beach tourism adds to the
policy reasons for protecting public access to the beaches and waters of the
state. 296
Practical considerations also point to this direction. A rule that leaves
the property boundary fixed, even as the boundary moves farther from
shore, would create innumerable practical problems. Walton County,
located in Florida’s panhandle region, has already experienced intense
conflicts because littoral landowners installed fences to enclose the beach
above what they believed to be the MHWL, in efforts to exclude the public
from the dry sand beach. 297 Many beachfront owners posted signs intended
to keep the public off the dry sand beach, without a clear understanding that
the public may have already acquired rights to use the dry sand beach under
the doctrine of customary use. 298 The resulting conflict led the county
commission to develop an ordinance that sought to mediate the conflict
between the public’s rights and the landowner’s interests. 299
A rule that encourages landowners to continue to think of submerged
lands as their private property would extend this type of conflict from the
dry sand into the waters themselves. In this setting, the potential for
landowner interference with navigation and beachgoers’ access to the water
would intensify the challenges local or state governments face in
developing rules to regulate landowner conduct and protect the public
interest. According landowners title to submerged lands would also
295. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 1106 (describing these rights as an easement to the public
from the state).
296. See Christie, supra note 3, at 38 (listing the benefits accrued from beach restoration).
297. Walton Update, supra note 34; Dotty Nist, Citizens Ask Commissioners to Ensure Public
https://defuniakherald.com/
Access and Use of the Beach, THE DEFUNIAK HERALD (Mar 28, 2016),
uncategorized/citizens-ask-commissioners-to-ensure-public-access-and-use-of-the-beach/.
298. Wheeler, Walton Comm’n, supra note 28.
299. Id. It achieves this through a zoning strategy that creates a 15-foot buffer zone measured
seaward from the toe of the dune or any permanent habitable structure (whichever is farther seaward).
Public use is prohibited in the buffer zone, but the public’s customary use is protected on the remainder
of the beach. Walton County Ordinance No. 2016-23 (copy on file with the author). The Commission
voted to stay enforcement of the new ordinance until April 1, 2017. Several residents have filed
litigation challenging the ordinance. See Second Amended Complaint, Alford v. Walton County, No.:
3:16-cv-00362-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2016) (alleging that the ordinance violates Plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights).
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reinforce the very simplistic-binary thinking that some property rights
rhetoric promotes: the “it’s my property or it’s not” argument. This rhetoric
tends to create hostility toward even reasonable and legitimate government
regulations. 300 In this case, regulation would very likely be necessary to
protect the public’s clearly established rights of access to water and public
trust lands, as well as rights acquired through customary use. 301 Moreover,
such an approach would increase the cost and decrease the options for local
governments considering retreat as an option for adaptation. 302
Balanced against these arguments are littoral owners’ property rights.
These fundamental rights deserve protection, and courts must consider
seriously their contours and what protection is warranted. However, as
illustrated above, allowing the property line to become move underwater is
unlikely, ultimately, to serve landowners’ interests. Indeed, such an
outcome would likely prove a pyrrhic victory in most cases.303 Moreover,
there are avenues open to landowners who wish to protect their lands from
erosion. 304 For better or worse, Florida statutory law and current regulatory
practice generally permit landowners to construct sea walls to protect their
property against erosion. 305 While that policy may be maladaptive, 306 it
300. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 1106–08 (discussing the controversy between private coastal
owners’ right to armor property and the public interest).
301. See United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding landowners’
armoring trespassed and interfered with tribal rights to tidelands).
302. See J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 272 (Michael Gerrard ed.,
2011) (surveying relative advantages of retreat and barriers to local governments implementing such a
policy).
303. See Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 192, at 29, 30–32 (noting the eventual likelihood that it
will become impossible or impracticable to maintain essential public services in many coastal areas
subject to regular inundation).
304. CHARLES R. O’NEILL JR., STRUCTURAL METHODS FOR CONTROLLING COASTAL EROSION
1–3 (1986), https://www.seagrant.umaine.edu/files/chg/nyexth86001.pdf (listing methods of coastal
erosion control with corresponding advantages and disadvantages depending on location).
305. The Florida DEP may authorize installations such as seawalls, groins, and jetties upon
consideration of facts and circumstances, including potential effects of the structures on the beach-dune
system. The DEP may grant permits to protect private structures that are vulnerable to damage from
frequent coastal storms. FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (2012). The DEP also issues permits allowing future
installations on structures not yet vulnerable to damage, contingent upon the occurrence of specified
changes to the coastal system that would render the structure vulnerable. Id. § 161.085(2)(b) (2009). In
addition, the DEP grants permits to protect structures on a property surrounded on both sides by
properties with sea walls under what is known as the gap-closing provision. Id. § 161.085(2)(c).
306. Ruppert, supra note 31, at 75 (explaining Florida’s policy on rigid coastal armoring).
Florida’s current rules require that sea walls be constructed only to withstand historic storm surges do
short-sighted landowners no favors; it seems likely that owners who have constructed sea walls will find
these eroded and overtopped in time. Urbina, supra note 148 (illustration shows an overtopped sea wall
during a high tide in Isle of Palms, South Carolina). Destroyed sea walls could be seen along Florida’s
northeast coast in September 2016 after Hurricane Matthew passed near to the coast (photos on file with
author).
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does provide landowners an avenue to protect their interests in advance of
erosion. Allowing reasonable steps to protect coastal property before
erosion seems preferable to a rule that would encourage landowners to
reclaim after erosion has occurred.
As a practical matter, reclamation, after erosion has submerged the
property, is likely unaffordable and infeasible for most property owners
absent governmental sponsorship and funding. 307 Thus, if courts endorse a
rule that fixes the property line notwithstanding sea-level rise, the right to
use or to meaningfully control that property would likely be a hollow
promise.
Moreover, Florida statutory law provides additional protection for
littoral landowners’ interests in adjacent submerged lands. 308 Florida Statute
§ 161.041 permits littoral landowners to seek permission to undertake
activities on sovereign submerged lands for various purposes. 309 This
mechanism would remain available to littoral landowners, even if the
boundary migrated. This preserves for landowners the only real value they
retain after submersion: a right to use the submerged lands for various
purposes connected with their littoral property, including protecting that
property. This statutory mechanism provides a practical administrative
framework consistent with the constitutional protections for sovereign
lands, and incorporates some modest protections for the public interest. 310
Thus, a court can reconcile the common law of property and the
constitutional and common law protections for sovereign submerged lands
in a context of ongoing coastal erosion. A court may hold that, generally,
the boundary of littoral lands should migrate with the MHWL. This will
protect the public’s strong interest in retaining submerged lands in
sovereign ownership, as well as avoid many practical problems that an
alternate outcome would create. Ultimately, this will protect both the
307. The cost of undertaking private beach restoration is one obstacle. Added to this,
undertaking restoration on a single parcel will not be effective in many settings. Therefore, private
landowners who wish to undertake this initiative without governmental leadership or support also face
administrative and collective action obstacles. Where landowners have enormous wealth and a large
investment in the property, or where the form of ownership already has a collective dimension, as in a
large condominium or neighborhood association, this may prove more feasible.
308. FLA. STAT. § 161.041.
309. See id. (authorizing the Florida Department of Environmental Protection to grant coastal
construction permits for construction of structures and physical activity, such as dredging of inlet
channels or deposition of beach material on sovereignty lands below the mean high-water line); see also
FLA. STAT. § 253.0347 (2017) (authorizing the lease of sovereign submerged lands for private
residential docks and piers).
310. These protections include the requirement that the activity not interfere with the public use
of any area of a beach seaward of the mean high-water line, or, if such interference is unavoidable, that
the landowner provide alternate access. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 161.041, 161.085 (codifying permitting
structures for individuals to protect their private property).
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landowners’ and the public’s interests. The approach will free landowners
from paying taxes on these lands while allowing them to use sovereign
submerged lands when feasible, pursuant to the statutory framework.
However, adopting a migratory boundary as the default rule does not
need to exclude courts from considering fairness to landowners, albeit on a
case-by-case basis. Because of the strong protections accorded to private
property, a court must consider factors in individual cases that affect
fairness.
For example, the timing of the landowner’s investment relative to the
pattern of erosion might be relevant to the court’s analysis. For a landowner
who purchased the land before anyone knew that the area was critically
eroding, and for whom loss of the property value would be significant,
fairness might dictate allowing the boundary to remain fixed
notwithstanding the public interest. However, if a landowner purchased the
property or made substantial improvements after the likely impact of
erosion and storm surges became evident, equity would be less in their
favor. In such a case, the court will likely find that fairness did not require
overriding the public interest.
However, the availability of federally subsidized insurance and other
support or options (such as offers from local or state governments to
purchase rolling easements or other interests in the property) from state,
federal, and local governments might similarly offset fairness concerns.
This discussion concludes that public interest would, in most cases,
outweigh fairness to individual landowners and, thus, require an ambulatory
boundary in the context of sea-level rise. However, a court might balance
interests differently and conclude that fairness to landowners outweighs the
public interest in keeping sovereign lands. In such cases, the court will hold
that fixed boundaries should remain, despite the practical concerns noted
above. This would prioritize private property rights over public interest. A
justification for this approach would be the strong protection given to
private property, and the background rule that boundaries ordinarily remain
fixed. 311
However, invoking the background rule regarding property boundaries
is not an automatic trump. As noted above, this rule is already subject to
numerous exceptions, sometimes in contexts that are arguably less
compelling than this one. 312 Common law recognizes exceptions allowing
311. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (discussing the protections available to private
landowners in property law).
312. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (arguing that the default rule inhibiting change
in boundaries absent voluntary conveyance or eminent domain is already subject to numerous
exceptions).
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changes to boundaries and rules regarding the validity of titles to achieve
values like fairness, 313 productive use of land, 314 and efficiency. 315 In other
contexts, property rights created by servitudes lose protection when
circumstances change so significantly that the benefits of the covenant no
longer accrue. 316
Moreover, as described above, applying the background rule creates
substantial, practical problems. In many cases, activities on the newly
submerged lands require not only permits under state law, but also federal
permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act. 317 Where state agencies may be
more susceptible to local political pressure to grant permits to appease
landowners, the Army Corps of Engineers might be less easily swayed by
this pressure. 318 In addition, the Corps’ more rigorous engineering and
environmental standards and analysis would likely doom attempts by
landowners to reclaim submerged property. 319
Moreover, the likelihood that more pervasive efforts to reclaim
submerged areas will interfere with public access to water for recreation,
navigation, and commerce means that landowners will “own” the land only
in name, possessing few of the rights typically associated with property
ownership. 320 In this sense, fixing the coastal property boundary in the
context of sea-level rise is more of a disservice to littoral landowners. Such
a rule misleads purchasers, causing them to overestimate the nature of the
rights they will have in the future as seas rise. In addition, encouraging
landowners to think of permanently submerged lands as their property will
generate conflict between the public and littoral landowners seeking to
determine the bounds of their rights.
For all these reasons, even if a court holds the ambulatory boundaries
framework inapplicable, the court will likely adopt a default rule favoring
313. For example, the common law protection of bona fide purchasers and its codification in
recording statutes reflects a decision to achieve fairness at the expense of bedrock common law
principles regarding the validity of title and the priority accorded an earlier transfer. POWELL, supra note
6, § 82.01[3].
314. For example, the doctrine of adverse possession requires actual use of the property for the
designated statutory period, thus privileging productive use of land over non-use.
315. One value served by the concept of adverse possession is to ensure efficient allocation of
land. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 6, § 91.01[4] n.30.
316. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.02[2].
317. FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (prohibiting construction of
any physical structure on navigable waters unless the Army Corps of Engineers grants a permit).
318. David L. Hankey, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Erosion of
Administrative Control by Environmental Suits, 1980 DUKE L.J. 170, 182 (1980) (explaining that
Congress urged the Corps to follow the statute strictly).
319. Id. at 182–83.
320. See Sax, Sea Level Rising, supra note 5, at 644 (explaining that landowners making
reclamation efforts have a duty to provide public access to the water).
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an ambulatory boundary, absent a finding that fairness or the public interest
necessitates a fixed boundary. Adopting a default rule is an important step
in creating clarity and consistency in the application of the law. At the same
time, adopting a default rule, rather than an absolute rule, acknowledges the
tension inherent in reconciling these two bodies of law (the ambulatory
boundaries framework and the constitutional, statutory, and common laws)
and the values they protect. Thus, it leaves room for courts to deviate from
the default rule when fairness to the individual landowner or the public
interest dictates as much.
This approach—sweeping away the ambulatory boundaries
framework—while bold, has the merit of creating clarity long sought by
litigants, courts, and commentators. Given the challenges all parties will
face in efforts to adapt to sea-level rise, clearing away the debris and
clarifying the question of boundaries frees resources to address questions
more meaningful than whether an unaided human eye can observe the
changes on the coastline as they occurred. However, even if non-application
of the framework is justified under basic principles of common law, courts
will likely hesitate to make a decision that could be characterized as a
change in the law, rather than a mere change in the facts (which affects the
determination of what law applies). 321
D. Objections to the Proposal to Set Aside the Ambulatory Boundaries
Framework in the Context of Sea-level Rise
The sections above outline two approaches courts might take in
recognizing the legal significance of sea-level rise and adapting the law.
However, because the second of these—a decision not to apply the erosionavulsion doctrine—represents a decisive change in long-standing precedent,
it would inevitably draw scrutiny and face serious challenges. 322 Moreover,
as noted above, courts are rightly reluctant to take steps that could be
characterized as changing the common law. 323 This section addresses some
of these concerns. Although common law property doctrines are notoriously
sticky and criticized for their adherence to antiquated rules, courts and
judges have long recognized that they are not required to adhere to rules
when circumstances have changed, particularly when applying the older

321. See Jones, supra note 247, at 457–58 (explaining that courts prefer to distinguish old
rulings rather than overrule prior decisions).
322. See id. at 457–58 (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and its binding effect on lower
court decisions).
323. See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 722 (2010) (discussing the potential judicial elimination of common law private property rights).

2017]

Beach Law Cleanup

147

doctrines, which no longer serve their purposes. 324 In Riddle v. Harmon, a
California Court of Appeals rejected the rule that a joint tenant of real estate
could not transfer property to herself as tenant in common without use of a
straw person. 325 The court highlighted that the rule against allowing a joint
tenant to transfer to herself as a tenant in common was premised on the
anachronistic practice of livery of seisin as the means of conveyance. 326
Changes in the means of conveyance made the prohibition on transfer of an
interest to oneself anachronistic. 327 The court also highlighted that the rule
aligned with common sense and efficiency, as well as effectuating the intent
of the grantor. 328 The court cited the famous lines from Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s The Path of the Law:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. 329

In Garner v. Gerrish, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the rule
that a lease at the will of the lessee must also be at the will of the lessor. 330
It noted that the rule was generally accepted throughout the United States in
the 19th Century, but nevertheless rejected it. 331 Like the “straw man” in
Riddle v. Harmon, the court emphasized the rule’s link to the obsolete
practice of livery of seisin, and noted that the rule had been criticized for
violating terms of the agreement and frustrating the intent of the parties. 332
Throughout the 20th century, courts rejected or revised a number of
common law doctrines in the realm of landlord-tenant law that became
obsolete because of the changes in the world around them. The archaic
rules fit poorly with the social values recognized as important in property

324. Lovett, supra note 10, at 469.
325. Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). Prior to the decision, a
joint tenant could achieve the same objective by conveying her interest to a third person (the “straw”
person), which severed the joint tenancy, creating a tenancy in common. Id. at 532. The third person
could then immediately reconvey the interest in the property, now unburdened by the right of
survivorship, to the original joint-tenant conveyor. Id.
326. Id. at 533.
327. Id. at 533–34.
328. Id. at 534.
329. Id. (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
330. Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1984).
331. Id. at 224.
332. Id.
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law. 333 For example, courts rejected self-help as a remedy because it
induced violent conflict and deprived landlords of adequate judicial
remedies. 334 Similarly, the implied warranty of habitability was first
adopted in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation. 335 Numerous states
adopted it later, recognizing changes in the landlord-tenant relationship in
20th century society. 336 In other words, implicit factual assumptions about
the nature of the housing tenants sought, their ability to perform necessary
repairs, and the relative bargaining power of landlords and tenants that
underlay the doctrine were no longer warranted. 337
Similarly, in real estate transactions, state courts have steadily rejected
the doctrine of caveat emptor, and moved to impose a duty to disclose
latent defects on sellers of real property. 338 State courts criticized the old
rule as allowing conduct that violates fair dealing and good faith. A number
of the courts revisiting the doctrines recognized that there were relevant
doctrinal forces beyond the rule in question. In some cases, this included
doctrines, principles, or values drawn from contract or tort law. 339
Similarly, a court setting aside the ambulatory boundaries framework could
acknowledge the importance of constitutional and common law principles,
and values associated with protecting the public trust and the sovereign
ownership of submerged lands in determining coastal boundaries in an era
of sea-level rise. 340
There is also precedent for courts incorporating recognition of changed
circumstances into substantive property doctrine. 341 For example, changed
circumstances are one of the accepted rationales for arguing that a real
covenant or equitable servitude should be terminated. 342 Courts recognize
that even though a real covenant or servitude is an interest in land, it cannot
survive substantial changes that make the area no longer suitable for the
333. See Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978) (discussing the departure from a
common law rule).
334. Id.
335. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
336. See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207–08 (Vt. 1984) (finding that 20th century tenants
are in an inferior bargaining position to their landlords because tenants are not experienced in
maintenance work).
337. Id.
338. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (discussing the duty to disclose
latent defects to buyers).
339. See id. at 628 (discussing tort law’s relation to the duty to disclose latent defects).
340. E.g., State of Florida v. Fla. Nat’l Props., Inc., 338 So. 2d 13, 18 (Fla. 1976) (considering
constitutional and common law principles and sovereignty in declaring a new coastal boundary statute
unconstitutional).
341. Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed
Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1206–07 (1989).
342. Id. at 1188.
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uses envisioned by the restriction. 343 Moreover, the scope of easements has
been allowed to change and expand to reflect gradual evolution in
technology. 344 All of these rules have developed to allow property law to
adapt when changes external to the law affect the law’s ability to achieve its
goals. 345 Here, the law governing ambulatory boundaries faces serious
challenges, not only because of its inherent limitations, but also because
changes external to the law have redefined and broadened the scope of the
interests at stake.
Nonetheless, one might distinguish all of these instances by
highlighting that the changes resulting from sea-level rise are not mere
changes in remedy or recognition of a property owner’s new duty. Instead,
they are changes that affect the very method by which courts will determine
coastal boundaries. 346
One response to this concern is that coastal boundaries are already
ambulatory. 347 Landowners currently take property subject to a set of rules
that are sufficiently arcane and vague that few likely understand the process
by which their boundaries are determined. 348 Moreover, these rules make
future boundaries entirely unpredictable, dependent as they are on the
vagaries of the ocean. 349 Thus, the idea that landowners have somehow
relied on the existing doctrine and should be protected in that reliance is a
weak claim. 350 Moreover, property law is no stranger to doctrines that can
effect equally if not more significant changes to an owner’s rights—for
example, the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription. 351
A final concern that eliminating the ambulatory boundaries framework
raises is the risk that a court would consider this as changing the common
law in a way that would justify a claim of a “judicial taking,” or a

343. Id. at 1207–08.
344. See Marcus Cable Assocs. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. 2002) (recognizing that the
use of an easement may change to accommodate technological developments).
345. Blackie, supra note 341, at 1217.
346. WYMAN & WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 1959–60.
347. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 59, at 195, 197 (explaining that coastal boundaries are
defined by the average rise and fall of the tide).
348. E.g., Wyman & Williams, supra note 71, at 1967–68 (summarizing a case where a court
held defendant did not trespass because it was not clear where the boundary was).
349. Id. at 1958, 1967.
350. See Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Roger J.
Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 622–23 (1961)) (“We are given to
justifying our tolerance for anachronistic precedents by rationalizing that they have engendered so much
reliance as to preclude their liquidation. Sometimes, however, we assume reliance when in fact it has
been dissipated by the patent weakness of the precedent. Those who plead reliance do not necessarily
practice it.”).
351. POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.02.
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deprivation of property without due process. 352 This only seems a risk with
the comprehensive approach outlined above.Moreover, courts have yet to
adopt a judicial takings theory. However, four of the eight Justices on the
Supreme Court at the close of the Obama Administration indicated support
for such a theory. 353 It is impossible to predict what such a doctrine would
look like, given that it does not exist. If the Court adopted the approach laid
out by the late Justice Scalia, in a portion of the Stop the Beach
Renourishment opinion joined by Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas, a
judicial taking would be found if a court “recharacterize[d] as public
property what was previously private property.” 354 Justice Kennedy, in an
opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, noted that the common law tradition
allows “incremental modifications to property law . . . .” 355 His opinion
highlighted problems with the judicial takings theory and noted the
constraints already imposed by the due process clause, which prevents state
courts from eliminating or substantially changing “established property
rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner,” 356 or abandoning
settled principles. 357 Applying these as the test for judicial taking, one can
argue that setting aside the ambulatory boundaries framework in the context
of sea-level rise does not recharacterize property, change established
property rights, or abandon settled principles. 358
First, as noted above, deciding whether facts have changed in
materially relevant ways, such that a body of law is not the applicable rule

352. See J. Peter Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOL. L. Q. 619, 625 (2011)
(discussing the Supreme court’s acknowledgement of the possibility that a state court might violate due
process by an interpretation of state property doctrine that lacked a “fair and substantial” basis in
precedent).
353. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713–15 (2010).
For critiques of this theory, see John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary
is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 490 (2010); Byrne, supra note 352, at 636.
354. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 713, 715 (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not
transform private property into public property without compensation.” (quoting Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980))). In a footnote, Justice Scalia amplified the
level of clarity about the existence of the claimed right: “A property right is not established if there is
doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but accept the
determination of the state court.” Id. at 726 n.9. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg in a concurrence
expressed the view that no taking occurred, but also specified that the Court need not and should not
reach the issue of whether a judicial takings theory was valid. Id. at 742–45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
355. Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
356. Id. at 737.
357. Id. at 738.
358. See Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation Tools “TakingsProof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 193–94 (2013) (explaining that clarifying unsettled property
rights does not eliminate established property rights).
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of decision, does not change the law. It merely determines the proper law to
apply, which is a fundamental judicial role.359
Second, this article’s premise is that the changing nature of the
environment—not the courts—has unsettled the law. As John Echeverria
noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the common law
can and does change, and that changed circumstances can justify such
evolution in the law. 360 The argument for not applying the ambulatory
boundaries framework is precisely that circumstances have changed.
Third, it is important to recall that coastal property boundaries are not
settled under existing law. 361 Those who own land at the water’s edge
already are and have always been subject to boundaries that change when
the ocean moves. 362 Thus, landowners cannot claim to have a fixed
expectation to own property at the water’s edge in the future. 363 A court
seeking to apply law in new circumstances is clarifying the law, not
changing it. 364 Thus, as Michael Wolf emphasizes, the incoherent and
confusing state of the common law in this area works against a judicial
takings claim under the plurality opinion’s analysis. 365 Added to that, the
presumption that most states favor the accretion-erosion doctrines means
that upon inundation, the boundary presumptively moves, and inundated
areas become public. 366 A judicial decision stating that this framework no
longer applies inevitably does not help or hurt any particular landowner.
More importantly, the root cause of any change to the property owner’s
rights is not the judicial decision, but a documented force of nature that has
always been recognized as having the power to trigger legal changes:
inundation of property. 367 Finally, the leading treatise writers suggest that
the ambulatory boundaries doctrines may simply be rules of construction,
not positive rules of law for the ascertainment of boundaries. 368 If a court
adopts this view, the rules have even less force. A claim of a property right
grounded in a rule of construction would seem weaker than one grounded in
a rule of law. Thus, even the specter of a judicial takings claim does not
preclude a court from seeking to adapt the law in this area.
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CARTER & BURKE, supra note 259, at 27, 29, 45.
Echeverria, supra note 353, at 636.
Christie, supra note 3, at 26–27, 30.
Id.
Id.
Wolf, supra note 358, at 194.
Id.
Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 353.
See Wolf, supra note 358, at 191 (analyzing issues as applied to a ban on armoring).
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CONCLUSION
The common law framework for ambulatory boundaries developed to
address changes in the shoreline that were perceived as unpredictable,
bidirectional, and episodic, with limited geographic extent. This paper
argues that cases of coastal erosion in an era of predictable, ongoing,
unidirectional, and pervasive sea-level rise are materially different from
those that justified applying the ambulatory boundaries framework. It
further claims that the rationales supporting application of these doctrines
from their earliest common law expression to today do not support their
application in this new setting.
Courts may respond by applying the ambulatory boundaries framework
with explicit consideration of how sea-level rise necessitates changes in the
doctrines in order to align the law with the rationales that support the
framework. Alternatively, courts may conclude that the framework is
inapplicable in this new setting, and then apply the substantial remaining
body of law that governs property boundaries and ownership, and control of
public trust and sovereign submerged lands—without the overlay of the
erosion-avulsion framework. This body of law, composed of constitutional,
statutory, and common law doctrines, will provide ample guidance for
courts in the absence of the ambulatory boundaries framework. This article
suggests that courts should consider these options in order to better align
the law with the reality of a coastline increasingly shaped by sea-level rise.

